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Interoperability among information and communications 
technologies (ICT) is widely believed to promote socially desira-
ble goals, such as fostering competition and innovation, en-
hancing consumer satisfaction, and promoting economic 
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growth.1 ICT interoperability means “the ability to transfer and 
render useful data and other information across systems . . . 
applications, or components.”2 To achieve interoperability, 
firms must have access to and be able to use the precise infor-
mation that defines the boundaries between ICT systems, that 
is, the interfaces between them.3 Insofar as patents are issuing 
on interface designs and components, many worry that they 
will be used to impede interoperability.4 This Article considers 
whether such patents are, in fact, impeding interoperability, 
and if so, what should be done about it. 
Part I explains the significance of interfaces and interope-
rability, various technical challenges involved in designing and 
implementing interfaces, and the competitive importance of in-
teroperability to various stakeholders. It also considers how in-
tellectual property (IP) rules and IP strategies about interface 
protection evolved over time and why patents eventually 
emerged as an important source of IP protection. The factors 
that motivate firms to seek patents for ICT interfaces (or not) 
are complex and dynamic. Part I gives examples of interface 
patents that have impacted interoperability.  
Part II discusses the extensive array of policy options that 
commentators, policymakers, and courts have considered as 
possible responses to the exclusionary potential of ICT interface 
patents. Subpart A considers proposals that would, in essence, 
make interfaces unprotectable by patent law.5 Subpart B dis-
cusses ways in which patent rules might be tailored to facilitate 
 
 1. See, e.g., URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, BREAKING DOWN DIGITAL 
BARRIERS: WHEN AND HOW ICT INTEROPERABILITY DRIVES INNOVATION 1 
(2007), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-breaking-barriers.pdf. 
Gasser and Palfrey observe that it is very difficult to find anyone who speaks 
out against interoperability. Id. It bears mentioning, however, that interope-
rability also enables viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spam, and other malware. 
Id. at 2. 
 2. Id. at 4. 
 3. Cf. id. at 9 (explaining that the simplest approach to achieving tech-
nical interoperability is through “unilateral openness”).  
 4. See, e.g., INFORMATION SERVICES INDUSTRY DIVISION, INTERIM RE-
PORT OF THE “STUDY GROUP ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE AND 
PROMOTION OF INNOVATION” (Oct. 11, 2005),  http://www.meti.go.jp/english/ 
information/downloadfiles/051017LegalProtectionSoftware.pdf [hereinafter 
ISID INTERIM REPORT] (expressing concern about the exclusionary potency of 
patents that can impede innovation in the software sector). 
 5. Part II.A offers an interpretation of the European Directive on the le-
gal protection of computer programs as excluding interfaces from IP protec-
tion. See Council Directive 91/250, On the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC) [hereinafter Software Directive]. 
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interoperability. Subpart C explores some proposals to subject 
interface patents to liability rules, such as awarding damages 
instead of injunctive relief as to those who use patented inter-
faces to achieve interoperability. Subpart D considers antitrust 
and competition law as a source of oversight of a dominant 
firm’s refusal to license interface information and IP rights (if 
any) in such information. In particular, it reviews the Euro-
pean Commission’s order requiring Microsoft to prepare docu-
ments providing extensive technical detail about Windows in-
terfaces and to make this information available on reasonable 
licensing terms to competitors in the work group server operat-
ing system (WGS-OS) market.6 Subpart E focuses on some pri-
vate sector initiatives, including those undertaken by standard-
setting organizations (SSOs), aimed at controlling the un-
bridled exclusionary power of interface patents by requiring 
commitments to license such patents, insofar as they are essen-
tial to achieving interoperability, on royalty-free (RF) or rea-
sonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms.  
Part III observes that there is a considerable amount of in-
teroperability in today’s ICT environment, notwithstanding the 
issuance of many interface patents and the dire predictions of 
social harm that underlie proposals for strong regulatory res-
ponses to interface patents. There are generally adequate in-
centives for firms to make interface information available or li-
cense interface patents on reasonable terms. In view of this, it 
does not seem necessary or appropriate to adopt strong meas-
ures, such as excluding interfaces from patent protection or 
immunizing use of interface patents to achieve interoperability. 
Interface patents pose the gravest risks for competition and fol-
low-on innovation when exercise of such patents are essential 
to interoperability, when the patents are held by established 
firms with market power, and when there are incentives for 
firms to enforce interface patents in a manner that provides the 
opportunity for leveraging a dominant firm’s power in one 
market into that of an adjacent market. If regulatory interven-
tion of interface patents is appropriate at all, it should only be 
undertaken in a targeted manner to address specific harms.  
 
 6. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission decision 
of March 24, 2004, relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
(Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), Brussels, April 21, 2004, C(2004)900 final, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/ 
en.pdf [hereinafter Commission Decision]. The Commission’s order was af-
firmed in Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601. 
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Yet, this Article also recommends some tailoring of patent 
rules in a manner that is likely to foster greater ICT interope-
rability without undermining incentives to invest in develop-
ment of innovative interfaces. This includes closer scrutiny of 
patent applications that cover interface techniques, more rigor-
ous disclosure of enablement of interface inventions, more 
meaningful and cost-effective post-grant review of patent valid-
ity, and judicial rulings that antireverse engineering clauses in 
mass-market licenses should not be enforceable.  
I.  THE ROLE OF IP LAW  
IN THE PROTECTION OF INTERFACES   
Intellectual property law often plays an important role in 
regulating the use of ICT interfaces, but other factors also af-
fect interoperability. To set the stage for contextualizing the 
role of IP law in facilitating or blocking interoperability, Sec-
tion A first offers some refined definitions of interfaces, intero-
perability, and related concepts, and then discusses incentives 
that firms have to disclose interface information to enable inte-
roperability and to assert IP rights in these interfaces. Some 
firms are relatively open and nonproprietary toward their in-
terfaces, often in hopes of generating network effects for their 
systems. Other firms adopt business strategies that depend on 
withholding interface information from those who want it and 
using IP rights to block interoperability. Sometimes, firms’ in-
centives toward open or proprietary interfaces change over 
time, as their business strategies evolve. Section B explains 
why makers of early ICT systems tended to be nonproprietary 
toward interfaces, why firms later came to rely on trade secrecy 
and copyright law to protect interfaces, why efforts to assert 
copyright protection in interfaces failed, and why this failure 
contributed to a rise in the role of patents in protecting inter-
faces. Section C considers some advantages that patents have 
over trade secrecy in protecting interfaces, particularly in con-
trolling interoperability. Section D shows that interface patents 
are sometimes used to challenge or thwart the development of 
interoperable technologies. 
A. SOME DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
As applied to ICT systems, interoperability means “[t]he 
capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data 
among various functional units in a manner that requires the 
 2009] PATENTS ON INTERFACES 1947 
 
user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics 
of those units.”7 A recent book points out: 
Interoperability doesn’t require that two systems be identical in de-
sign or implementation, only that they can exchange information and 
use the information they exchange. Interoperability requires that the 
information being exchanged is conceptually equivalent; once this 
equivalence is established, transforming different implementations to 
a common exchange format is a necessary but often trivial thing to 
do.8 
Interoperability can occur when the maker of one ICT sys-
tem develops interfaces that enable the exchange of informa-
tion between the entity it is developing and the entities with 
which its entity will interact, including importantly those de-
veloped by other firms.9 The modular structure of modern ICT 
products, which interconnect through interfaces, has brought 
about more and more rapid innovation than earlier monolithic 
systems (e.g., mainframe computers of yesteryear) provided, 
 
 7. Int’l Electrotechnical Comm. [IEC], Information Technology-
Vocabulary, at 6, ISO/IEC 2382-1 (3d ed. 1993). Although this Article will con-
centrate on interoperability in the computing and information industries, inte-
roperability is also a very important concept in the telecommunications indus-
try. To enable competition in telecom markets, it is necessary for incumbents 
to provide resources for others to interconnect with their systems, which mo-
nopoly providers are sometimes reluctant to do. There is a long history of regu-
lation of interconnection by both antitrust law and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission and similar agencies in other countries. See, e.g., Joseph 
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access 
Policies: Toward a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet 
Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 93–95 (2003) (discussing regulation of competi-
tion in telecommunications); see also 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2006) (discussing the 
duties imposed on incumbent local exchange carriers). 
 8. ROBERT J. GLUSHKO & TIM MCGRATH, DOCUMENT ENGINEERING: 
ANALYZING AND DESIGNING DOCUMENTS FOR BUSINESS INFORMATICS & WEB 
SERVICES § 6.0 (2005). 
 9. ICT interfaces are informational equivalents of the standard plug and 
socket designs that designers of electric appliances must use in order for their 
appliances to successfully interoperate with the electrical grid for which they 
are designed. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Strange Odyssey of Interfaces 
in Intellectual Property Law (Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, Law 
and Technology Scholarship, Paper No. 59, 2008), available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/lts/59/ (using this analogy). Although all coun-
tries have adopted a standardized electrical socket and plug design, many 
have adopted different socket and plug designs from one another. This is why 
international business travelers have to bring transformers and multiple plug 
kits with them when they travel. Spare parts for machinery raise similar is-
sues to the interface issues discussed in this Article. See Jens Schovsbo, As If 
Made for Each Other: Intellectual Property Rights and Protection of Compati-
ble Products, 29 INT’L. REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 510, 525–31 
(1998) (providing an argument critical of design protection legislation insofar 
as it impedes competition in product aftermarkets). 
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leading to improved components (such as memory, disk drives, 
and modems), mix and match experimentation to discover best 
functionalities, and a proliferation of applications.10 Consumers 
have benefitted by this innovation and also by the competition 
among providers of these components, which has pushed prices 
down and offered more choices than monolithic systems pro-
vided.11 
Interoperability enables modern ICT systems to be very 
powerful because they can call upon other systems’ functionali-
ties.12 It is not necessary, for example, for each software devel-
oper to write code to perform common functions, such as access-
ing files or directories, because developers of operating systems 
(OS) have incorporated these functionalities into their sys-
tems.13 A developer that wants others to build applications for 
its product—which it often will in order to make the product at-
tractive to customers—must make application programming in-
terfaces (APIs) available to other firms.14 APIs disclose the 
“hooks” (that is, standard formats for requests) that other de-
velopers must use to call upon the platform’s services to carry 
out specific tasks for their applications.15 In this respect, APIs 
are one-sided and outward-facing. That is, the developer of the 
API doesn’t need to reveal to other developers the fine details 
about how it provides the relevant service; it only needs to 
supply the API which defines the manner in which to request 
and successfully invoke the platform’s services.16 
Programmers can generally design the internal structure 
of programs to implement interfaces and encode those designs 
in source code in many different ways.17 The interfaces do, 
 
 10. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 7, at 92–93 (explaining briefly the 
evolution of the computer industry, including the innovation of computer com-
ponents). 
 11. See id. at 95–96 (discussing the benefits of modular systems, including 
innovation and lower prices). 
 12. See David Orenstein, Application Programming Interface, COMPU-
TERWORLD, Jan. 10, 2000, at 66 (explaining that “virtually all software has to 
request other software to do some things for it,” which occurs through applica-
tion programming interfaces). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. (“Corporate developers should consider including APIs in ap-
plications they develop, especially if they expect the applications to last and 
interact with other applications.”).  
 15. See id.  
 16. See id. 
 17. In rare instances, functionalities may be defined to be “bit exact,” that 
is, the interface must be encoded exactly in the same manner for the imple-
 2009] PATENTS ON INTERFACES 1949 
 
however, constrain program design to some degree because of 
the need to precisely conform a request for a program’s services 
to the interface specification for those services.18 
While APIs typically specify how applications should ex-
change information with the platform on which it is built, pro-
tocols are components of interfaces that often facilitate com-
munications (i.e., interoperability) across different computers 
or ICT systems.19 Protocols define rules for information ex-
changes by specifying, for example, how to start and end mes-
sages, how to format messages, what to do with corrupted or 
improperly formatted messages, and the like.20 ICT systems 
typically involve multiple layers of functional units that inte-
ract with one another through a set of defined protocols.21 File 
format specifications, including compression algorithms and 
digital rights management architectures, are also interfaces 
that affect interoperability among data files and programs and 
devices utilizing those files. 
Another important distinction is that between interfaces 
and standards. Sometimes interfaces are collaboratively devel-
oped by technologists with the intent to promulgate them as 
standards (e.g., the Hypertext Transfer Protocol a/k/a HTTP). 
Other interface designs initially developed by private parties 
(e.g., the Portable Document Format a/k/a PDF) are later for-
 
mentation to be interoperable. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 
F.2d 1510, 1515–16 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that exact copying of certain 
code segments is necessary to achieve interoperability). 
 18. See, e.g., JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL 
8 (1995) (explaining that new applications have to conform to all the interface 
specifications of an existing operating system used by the application and the 
computer). 
 19. See GLUSHKO & MCGRATH, supra note 8, § 9.5 (discussing protocols in 
the business process context). For a protocol to work across two computers, the 
code to implement it needs to be on both computers. With APIs, the code to 
implement the service only needs to be on one computer.  
 20. See id. 
 21. An important principle for modern communications systems is that 
“the entity responsible for a given protocol should respond only to events and 
messages from its counterpart in the same layer at the other end of the com-
munication.” Id. An e-mail server, for instance, can and should signal receipt 
of a message from another e-mail server, but not from other applications in 
different layers of the stack. Id. A good implementation of a protocol should be 
“robust,” that is, it should be conservative in what it sends and liberal in what 
it receives. See, e.g., INFO. SCIENCES INST., DOD STANDARD INTERNET PROTO-
COL 21 (1980), http://www.faqs.org/ftp/rfc/pdf/rfc760.txt.pdf (“That is, it should 
be careful to send well-formed datagrams, but should accept any datagram 
that it can interpret (e.g., not object to technical errors where the meaning is 
still clear).”). 
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mally adopted as standards. Privately developed interface de-
signs can also become de facto standards when the platforms 
for which they were designed become successful in the market-
place. Some interfaces and interface techniques, however, nev-
er become standards. 
Although it is useful to conceptualize ICT interoperability 
at a general level, it is important to realize that interoperabili-
ty has somewhat different meanings in different ICT contexts.22 
In the context of computer programs, for example, it means 
that programs can function effectively with other software 
and/or hardware to carry out the tasks they were designed to 
perform.23 In the context of digital identification (ID) systems, 
interoperability means the ability of two or more systems to 
understand ID information and metadata about users so that 
user data can be successfully transferred and exchanged among 
services using the ID system.24 In the context of technically 
protected digital music, interoperability means that two or 
more players are either using the same technical protection 
measures or each can convert its encoding of the work into the 
encoding scheme of the other system so that music can be 
played on many devices and/or made available in a variety of 
online channels.25 In the context of electronic commerce, inte-
roperability means an exchange of messages (e.g. an order and 
an acceptance of an order) that will result in a successful busi-
ness transaction.26 Although this Article will mainly focus on 
 
 22. See, e.g., GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 4–5 (explaining that the 
definition of interoperability depends on the views of the stakeholder).  
 23. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 43 (“The function of a comput-
er program is to communicate and work together with other components of a 
computer system and with users and, for this purpose, a logical and, where 
appropriate, physical interconnection and interaction is required to permit all 
elements of software and hardware to work with other software and hardware 
and with users in all the ways in which they are intended to function.”). This 
functional interconnection and interaction is what the Directive characterizes 
as interoperability. Id. 
 24. GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 5; see also JOHN PALFREY & URS 
GASSER, CASE STUDY: DIGITAL IDENTITY INTEROPERABILITY AND EINNOVATION 
10–11 (2007), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-digital-id.pdf 
(providing a definition for ID information interoperability).  
 25. See GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 5–6 (using a case study to 
provide an example of DRM interoperability); see also URS GASSER & JOHN 
PALFREY, CASE STUDY: DRM-PROTECTED MUSIC INTEROPERABILITY AND EIN-
NOVATION 4–7 (2007), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-drm-
music.pdf (providing a definition for DRM interoperability).  
 26. See GLUSHKO & MCGRATH, supra note 8, § 9.6.1. It is also important 
to distinguish between the technical capability for interoperability and actual 
implementations of this technical capability, which are likely to depend on 
 2009] PATENTS ON INTERFACES 1951 
 
computer program interfaces, many of the same legal and poli-
cy issues, as well as technical, economic, and business issues 
affecting interoperability, cut across ICT systems. 
Many stakeholders have interests in interoperability.27 De-
velopers of platforms have a very big stake in interoperability 
because they generally benefit from the development of applica-
tions that work on their platforms.28 This is largely because of 
the positive feedback loop created by network effects, as cus-
tomers are drawn to the platform as more applications are 
available for the platform, and more applications developers 
are drawn to the platform as the platform attracts more cus-
tomers.29 Developers of complementary products benefit by in-
teroperability because they can create products that work on 
platforms with large customer bases, and complements typical-
ly add value to the network.30 Consumers benefit from intero-
perability insofar as they can use the same information re-
sources on multiple platforms in a “plug and play” fashion.31 
Many intermediaries, such as vendors of ICT products, benefit 
when interoperability exists among products in the market-
place, as it is easier to sell compatible components. The very 
success of a platform may cause other developers to try to de-
velop a platform compatible with the successful platform, ar-
guing that consumers will benefit by having more than one 
source and stressing the importance of a level playing field on 
which competition can occur based on price, quality, and differ-
 
business agreements among the relevant firms. There are also important pow-
er dimensions to interoperability. Walmart, for instance, may demand that 
any firms that want to do business with it conform their business documents 
to the electronic data interface specifications that it has set forth. Other firms 
may be more willing to build interfaces and services that meet their suppliers’ 
needs.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Cf. id. (discussing the views of stakeholders, including platform pro-
viders). 
 29. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 
JURIMETRICS J. 35, 36 (1989); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Im-
plications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488–95 (1998). 
 30. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual 
Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 561 (2003) (explaining the benefits 
America Online receives by allowing complementary products to operate on its 
platform). 
 31. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David W. O’Brien, Encouraging Software 
Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255, 289 (1997). The deployment of noninteroperable 
systems also puts consumer investments at risk, as it may be difficult to pre-
dict which technology is likely to become the de facto standard. The market for 
high definition DVDs, for example, did not develop rapidly because of the non-
interoperability of the Blu-Ray and HD-DVD formats. 
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ences in feature sets.32 The market may become larger for all 
players when there is one interface and many implementations, 
rather than multiple platforms, each of which is noninteroper-
able with the other. The interests of successful platform devel-
opers and emerging competitors are, however, not always 
aligned.33 
Interoperability is often conceived as a binary concept: one 
ICT entity either interoperates with another ICT entity or it 
doesn’t.34 From the users’ standpoint, there is certainly some-
thing to this. But interoperability can also be conceived as a 
continuum or spectrum, along which some entities (e.g., pro-
grams or content) are more interoperable than others. (Market 
forces often require firms to be near the fully interoperable end 
of the continuum; in most cases, products that are only 90 per-
cent interoperable will find it difficult to compete against those 
that are more fully interoperable.) At one end of the spectrum 
are entirely closed systems that reveal no APIs. At the other 
end of the spectrum are systems that expose all details of its 
design, such as open source software.   
Microsoft is somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. It is 
closer to the open end of this spectrum insofar as it publishes 
many of its APIs and licenses others. These APIs are generally 
sufficient to allow independent software vendors (ISVs) to write 
programs that will operate on Windows-based platforms.35 Mi-
crosoft does not, however, disclose all of the interface informa-
tion that ISVs might want to know. Often the undisclosed in-
formation pertains to how one part of its system calls upon the 
services of another component.36  ISVs may want greater access 
to information about these system calls to achieve better per-
 
 32. See, e.g., BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 330–34 
 33. Id. 
 34. See GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 4 (providing a definition of 
interoperability).  
 35. See MSDN Library, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/default 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (containing many of Microsoft’s APIs).  
 36. Although Microsoft may justify nondisclosure on the grounds that it 
did not consider such information to be part of the APIs that ISVs need to 
know, critics of Microsoft have sometimes charged it with hiding interface in-
formation in order to gain strategic advantages (e.g., faster implementations of 
certain key functions) over firms whose products compete with Microsoft’s. 
See, e.g., Microsoft’s Allegedly Undocumented APIs—Comes v. Microsoft,  
http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2007020819534335 (Apr. 29, 
2007) (providing the expert’s supplemental report in Comes v. Microsoft ex-
plaining Microsoft’s use of undisclosed information to gain advantages over 
other firms). 
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formance or build a richer feature set for their programs.37 Fru-
strated about Microsoft’s limited disclosure of internal APIs, 
some have engaged in reverse engineering to discern and doc-
ument unlicensed interface information.38  
Microsoft is far from the only firm that has adopted a busi-
ness strategy that depends on controlling access to interface in-
formation and interoperability. Firms may adopt a controlled 
interoperability strategy because it may be more lucrative than 
a completely open, fully interoperable strategy. Consumers are 
presumably willing to pay a premium for value they perceive 
they are getting from at least some noninteroperable products. 
When Apple launched its iTunes service for selling digital mu-
sic to customers of its iPod technology, for example, it hoped to 
establish its own network and network effects without direct 
competition from other music platform providers.39 Apple’s con-
siderable success with this strategy gave RealNetworks incen-
tives to reverse engineer Apple’s FairPlay technology so that it 
could make its RealPlayer compatible with iTunes music.40 Al-
though Apple’s initial response was to threaten to sue Real-
Networks for violating certain IP rules, it soon adopted a more 
effective response by changing the iTunes interface to disable 
the RealPlayer’s compatibility feature.41 To compete effectively 
against Apple, RealNetworks has incentives to develop technol-
ogy and music services that would be more attractive to con-
sumers.42 Competition among proprietary systems, as well as 
among open systems, can promote social welfare.43 
Microsoft and Apple are among the many firms that rely on 
IP rights as one means by which to control interoperability and 
 
 37. Whether undocumented details are “essential” to achieving interope-
rability can be a matter of some debate. See, e.g., Nokia Corp. v. Interdigital 
Tech. Corp., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 445, [1]-[35] (Eng.) (addressing dispute be-
tween the parties as to the “essentiality” of certain patents to compliance with 
standards adopted by the European Technical Standards Institute for mobile 
telephones).  
 38. Numerous books have disclosed such APIs. See, e.g., SVEN SCHREIBER, 
UNDOCUMENTED WINDOWS 2000 SECRETS (2001). While some programmers 
believe that more API information is always better, there are some costs asso-
ciated with extensive APIs. The more extensive they are, the more difficult it 
may be to learn and make good use of them.  
 39. GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 6. 
 40. See id. at 9. 
 41. Cf. id. (expressing “objections” over the reverse engineering). 
 42. See id. at 9–10. 
 43. Cf. Weiser, supra note 30, at 536–40 (discussing the benefits of open 
systems and competitive platform models on society). 
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to stop unlicensed persons from offering compatible technolo-
gies. Because IP rights have played a complex and dynamic role 
in regulating interoperability, Section B will explain how IP 
law evolved as to interfaces and why patents were slow in be-
coming an important form of protection for interfaces. 
B. EVOLVING IP RULES AND PRACTICES AS TO INTERFACES 
In the early years of the industry, computers were stand-
alone devices that were typically physically connected to only a 
few terminals and output devices. Anyone who wanted to 
process the same data or programs on different machines had 
to hand-carry the punch cards or magnetic tape on which the 
information was stored from one machine to the next. After the 
development of computers capable of storing and executing 
programs and processing data, it became evident that custom-
ers valued having compatible systems. To aid customers in 
achieving compatibility, many firms, including IBM, often dis-
tributed source code and interface specifications without IP re-
strictions.44 Firms had incentives to make source code and/or 
interface specifications available and allow unrestricted use of 
them so that customers could, for instance, customize the tech-
nologies to meet their needs and so that other firms could make 
complementary products that would work on the hardware or 
with the software installed on that hardware. Even before the 
term “network effects” was coined to describe the phenomenon, 
it was obvious that a firm could create demand for its platform 
by aiding others to develop information resources for it.45 
 
 44. See, e.g., BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 19; see also Anita Stork, 
Note, The Use of Arbitration in Copyright Disputes: IBM v. Fujitsu, 3 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 241, 242–43 (1987) (pointing out that IBM distributed source code 
without copyright restrictions through the 1970s). 
 45. The open-publication strategy of that era was also possibly affected by 
uncertainties that then existed about whether computer programs, let alone 
interfaces, qualified for either copyright or patent protection. Although the 
Copyright Office began accepting registrations of computer programs in 1965, 
it did so under its “rule of doubt” (meaning that there is an express under-
standing that doubt exists as to whether the code qualifies for copyright pro-
tection should litigation later occur). Indeed, the registration certificates indi-
cated the Office’s doubt about the copyrightability of programs in machine-
executable form. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 31D (Jan. 1965), re-
printed in Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehen-
sive Analysis, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 652 n.72. See generally Pamela Samuel-
son, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer 
Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (explaining that 
the Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) failed to consider the primary aims of copyright 
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Starting in the mid- to late-1970s, manufacturers of com-
puter systems came to realize that interfaces were commercial-
ly valuable, and it became more common for firms to withhold 
source code or interface information from those who wanted 
access to them.46 Firms began to think of source code and inter-
face specifications as trade secrets and to distribute programs 
in object code form.47 They claimed copyright protection for that 
code and often hoped copyright would also protect them against 
reverse engineering (which inevitably requires making inter-
mediate copies of the code), thus indirectly preventing trade se-
crets in interfaces from being discerned and thwarting the ef-
forts of unlicensed parties to make interoperable systems.48  
In the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, some firms, IBM prom-
inently among them, also argued copyright protection should be 
available for original interfaces embodied in programs.49 The 
issue first arose in litigation when the manufacturer of an Ap-
ple clone computer claimed that it was necessary to copy the 
Apple OS so that their work-alike computers could achieve in-
teroperability with programs written for the Apple platform.50 
 
and patent law when recommending that current intellectual property law 
protect machine readable computer programs). Doubts about the patentability 
of programs arose because programs are texts and because many information 
innovations embedded in programs, such as algorithms, are “mental 
processes” (that is, processes that can be carried out in the human mind or 
with the aid of a pen and paper). See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 
71–72 (1972) (denying patentability of an algorithm for transforming binary 
coded decimals to pure binary form). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Benson 
Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Com-
puter Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990) [hereinafter 
Samuelson, Benson Revisited] (discussing case law and doctrinal develop-
ments related to the patentability of program algorithms and program-related 
inventions). 
 46. See, e.g., Farrell & Weiser, supra note 7, at 92 (“To keep its system 
closed, IBM kept the interfaces between the different parts of its system secret 
and proprietary.”). 
 47. Allen R. Grogan, Decompilation and Disassembly: Undoing Software 
Protection, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1984, at 1. 
 48. See id. (discussing the core argument for this approach).  
 49. Trademark and false advertising law is sometimes used to challenge 
those who develop compatible ICT systems. See, e.g., Creative Labs, Inc. v. Cy-
rix Corp., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872, 1876 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (granting a preliminary 
injunction against the sale of sound cards that were not “fully compatible” 
with the plaintiffs’ system, as the defendant’s ads claimed). 
 50. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 
1245 (3d Cir. 1983). Franklin also argued that Congress had only intended to 
protect application programs that interacted with people, not purely functional 
programs such as operating systems. See id. at 1246–52. The court did not find 
this or other Franklin defenses persuasive. See id. at 1251. This challenge was 
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The court responded: 
Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently 
developed application programs written for the Apple II, but that is a 
commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the 
somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expres-
sions have merged.51 
This dicta dimmed the prospects for success of future com-
patibility defenses to copyright claims. 
Further dimming these prospects was the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laborato-
ry, Inc.52 Whelan characterized computer programs as “literary 
works” and reasoned that since copyright law had long pro-
tected nonliteral elements (i.e., structure and organization) of 
literary works, such as novels and plays, it should protect the 
structure, sequence, and organization (SSO) of programs as 
well.53 Whelan deemed all program SSO to be protectable by 
copyright law as long as there was more than one way to struc-
ture a program to achieve the program’s functions.54 Without 
broad copyright protection for computer programs, and in par-
ticular, for aspects of program SSO that were costly and diffi-
cult to develop as well as commercially significant, the Whelan 
court worried that there would be too little protection to pro-
vide proper incentives to develop computer programs.55  
Because interfaces are unquestionably part of program 
SSO, Whelan seemed to extend copyright protection to them. 
When Computer Associates (CA) sued Altai for copying of CA’s 
interfaces,56 it relied heavily on Whelan.57 CA pointed to sub-
 
somewhat surprising, given that Congress had amended copyright law to clari-
fy that programs could be copyrighted. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2006)). 
 51. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253. 
 52. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). For a detailed explanation of the flaws in 
the Whelan analysis of the scope of copyright in computer programs, see Pa-
mela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes From 
the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1962–73 (2007). 
 53. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233–40, 1248. 
 54. Id. at 1236. If there was just one way to structure a program to per-
form particular functions, though, the “idea” of that function and its structural 
“expression” would be “merged” and treated as among the unprotectable pro-
gram “ideas.” Id. at 1228, 1247. 
 55. Id. at 1237.  
 56. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).  
 57. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant passim, Computer Assocs. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-7893) (relying heavily on 
Whelan). 
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stantial similarities between the compatibility components of 
Altai’s Oscar program and its CA-Scheduler program, especial-
ly as to their parameter lists (i.e., lists of information that must 
be sent or received by subroutines to invoke specific scheduling 
tasks).58 CA argued the parameter lists had been carefully and 
precisely designed, making them costly to develop and commer-
cially significant parts of its programs.59 CA argued that incen-
tives to invest in software development would be undermined if 
competitors such as Altai could appropriate program SSO with-
out fear of liability.60  
Altai was able to persuade the court to recognize that ex-
ternal factors sometimes constrain program design choices.61 
Because CA-Scheduler and Oscar provided the same scheduling 
services and both were designed to interoperate with the same 
IBM OS programs, similarities in their parameter lists were 
understandable and not evidence of infringement.62 The court 
in Altai asserted that extending copyright protection to pro-
gram interfaces would “have a corrosive effect on certain fun-
damental tenets of copyright doctrine”63 and suggesting patents 
as an alternative form of IP protection for interfaces.64  
The Altai decision may not initially have caused software 
developers and their lawyers to think seriously about patenting 
interfaces and other program SSO, in part because it took some 
years for Altai to defeat Whelan in the subsequent caselaw and 
 
 58. Id. at 5–6.  
 59. See id. at 3.  
 60. See id. at 14 (discussing some of the goals in seeking copyright protec-
tion).  
 61. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 9. The court in Altai relied on 
the Nimmer treatise which had taken the position that interfaces were aspects 
of programs for which no copyright protection should be available because of 
the constraints they placed on design choices of subsequent programmers. See 
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709–10 (2d Cir. 1992)  
(citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.01, at 13-4 (1991)).  
 62. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 12–14, Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. 
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (No.91-7893). 
 63. Altai, 982 F.2d at 712. The court criticized Whelan for its unduly 
broad conception of the scope of copyright in computer programs, for its re-
liance on metaphysical distinctions rather than practical considerations, and 
for its outdated comprehension of computer science. Id. at 705–06. Protecting 
interfaces would be corrosive of copyright principles because they are too func-
tional to be protected as original expression of an author. See, e.g., Samuelson, 
Benson Revisited, supra note 45, at 1146 n.472 (explaining that copyright and 
patent law should be “separate and exclusive”); infra Parts II–III. 
 64. Altai, 982 F.2d at 712. 
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emerge as the leading decision about software copyrights.65 
However, the patent option became more attractive after the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, 
Inc.66 
Sega was important in the IP-in-interfaces saga for at least 
four reasons. For one thing, it embraced Altai’s rhetorical ap-
proach to conceptualizing computer programs as utilitarian 
works eligible for only a thin scope of copyright protection.67 
Second, Sega followed Altai in ruling that program interfaces 
were elements of programs that copyright law did not protect; 
indeed, Sega spoke of interface information as “functional re-
quirements for achieving compatibility with other programs.”68 
Third, the court ruled that copying program code in the course 
of reverse engineering for a legitimate purpose such as extract-
ing interface information to make a compatible program did not 
infringe copyright.69 The court recognized that 
If disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair 
use, the owner of the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over 
the functional aspects of his work—aspects that were expressly 
denied copyright protection by Congress. In order to enjoy a 
lawful monopoly over the idea or functional principle underly-
ing a work, the creator of the work must satisfy the more strin-
gent standards imposed by the patent laws.70 
Fourth, it indicated that even copying some exact code 
from another program would not be infringement insofar as 
that code was essential to achieving interoperability.71 
 
 65. Altai has been followed in at least forty-nine subsequent decisions. 
See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 814–15 (1st Cir. 
1995). Lotus relied heavily on Whelan in support of its claim that Borland in-
fringed its copyright in the command hierarchy of the Lotus 1-2-3 user inter-
face. The First Circuit ruled that the command hierarchy was an unprotecta-
ble method of operating a spreadsheet program under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Id. 
at 815. Although the Supreme Court took Lotus’s appeal from the First Cir-
cuit’s ruling, the Court was evenly divided 4-4 on the merits, and hence af-
firmed the lower court’s ruling. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 
U.S. 233, 233 (1996) (per curiam). By 1996, however, Altai had become the 
standard software copyright-infringement case, displacing Whelan.  
 66. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 67. See id. at 1526 (“Under the Copyright Act, if a work is largely func-
tional, it receives only weak protection.”). 
 68. Id. at 1525–26. 
 69. Id. at 1527–28 (finding reverse engineering copies to be fair use). 
 70. Id. at 1526. 
 71. See id. at 1516, 1528–32 (treating certain Sega code as too functional 
for copyright protection). 
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After Sega, developers could no longer hope to protect in-
terfaces by copyright.  Because Sega endorsed unlicensed copy-
ing of code to extract interface information,72 it imperiled de-
veloper efforts to protect interfaces as trade secrets.73 Sega sig-
signaled that the only reliable means for protecting the func-
tional requirements for achieving interoperability was by pa-
tenting them. Patents have a key advantage over copyrights in 
protecting interfaces because patent law has no “merger” doc-
trine.74 Hence, if there is only one way to achieve a particular 
function and a developer has patented that one way, it can en-
force its patent to stop unlicensed uses.75 Moreover, patent law 
also has no explicit reverse engineering privilege.76 
Altai and Sega contributed to the eventual shift away from 
claims of copyright in program interfaces and toward reliance 
on patent protection. Patent protection also became more 
plausible and attractive as the courts became more receptive to 
software patents.77 The Supreme Court had initially cast doubt 
 
 72. Prior to Sega, some commentators had argued that reverse engineer-
ing of object code should be treated as both copyright infringement and trade- 
secret misappropriation. See e.g., Grogan, supra note 53, at 4–5. Some com-
mentators argue that reverse engineering should be treated as copyright in-
fringement because of the intermediate copying required to reverse engineer 
and as trade-secret misappropriation because the infringing copies made in 
reverse engineering constituted an improper means to get the trade secrets 
embodied in the object code. Id.  
 73. See Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and the Internet: Preventing the 
Internet from Being an Instrument of Destruction, in 12TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 403, 413 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Course 
Handbook Series No. G-877, 2006), WL 877 PLI/PAT. 403. 
 74. Cf. Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitu-
tional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 261, 296-
97 (2005) (advocating for an adoption of the merger doctrine for patents). 
 75. Patent law has, however, a number of policy options that can be em-
ployed to limit the scope of patents. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 passim (2003). 
 76. But see generally Julie E. Cohen et al., Patent Scope and Innovation in 
the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001) (exploring patent doctrines 
that might permit reverse engineering of software even if some components of 
the software were patented). 
 77. The European experience with software patents and special concerns 
about interface patents are discussed below in Part II.A. A concise history of 
European perspectives on software patents can be found in a study commis-
sioned by the European Parliament about the patentability of computer pro-
grams. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, 
at 2–6, COM (2002) 92 final (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www2.europarl 
.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=219592 [hereinafter Proposed Software Patent Directive]. 
See generally REINIER BAKELS & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, THE PATENTABILITY 
OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS: DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN-LEVEL LEGISLATION IN 
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on the patentability of program innovations in the 1970s,78 but 
the Court was receptive to one such patent in its 5-4 decision in 
1981 in Diamond v. Diehr.79 Relying on some broad language in 
Diehr,80 the Federal Circuit during the 1980s and 1990s devel-
oped a capacious conception of patentable subject matter under 
which virtually all computer program-related inventions are 
patentable.81 This, coupled with increasing “thinness” of copy-
right protection after Altai and Sega achieved widespread ac-
ceptance in the mid-1990s, led to a big surge in the patenting of 
software innovations,82 including the issuance of patents on in-
terfaces. 
Although program interfaces can generally be patented in 
the United States,83 firms do not always choose to seek patents 
 
THE FIELD OF PATENTS FOR SOFTWARE (2002) (discussing European-level legis-
lation in the field of patents for software), available at http://www.ivir.nl/ 
publications/other/softwarepatent.html.  
 78. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 584 (1978); Gottshalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972). 
 79. 450 U.S. 175, 175–76 (1981). Diehr claimed a new method of curing 
rubber that used a computer program to calculate when the temperature of 
the rubber inside molds had reached the proper curing point. Id. at 177. The 
PTO rejected Diehr’s claim because its only novelty lay in the program’s calcu-
lations. Id. at 179–81. The Diehr decision was initially perceived as a modest 
change in the patent landscape as to program-related inventions. Because the 
Court was so deeply divided, the majority opinion did not repudiate the 
Court’s earlier rulings on the unpatentability of certain program innovations, 
and Diehr involved a traditional manufacturing process (i.e., curing rubber). 
Id.  
 80. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (stating that patentable subject matter includes 
everything “under the sun made by man”) (citations omitted). 
 81. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the claimed subject matter was patentable). 
 82. See Josh Lerner et al., What is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: 
Evidence from Lotus v. Borland 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 11168, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11168 (not-
ing that there is empirical evidence of a surge in the patenting of software dat-
ing from the mid-1990s). 
 83. Software industry representatives with whom I spoke estimate that 
there are many thousands of patents on interfaces. Lexis searches for patents 
using search terms such as “application program interfaces” and “communica-
tions protocols” yield thousands of “hits” (Lexis search in the MEGA database 
on March 5, 2009 confirms this result). Patent lawyers believe there are likely 
many more interface patents than these searches reveal because patent appli-
cations often do not mention the term “interface” or “communications proto-
col.” Interfaces are sometimes claimed as a component of a feature they ena-
ble. See Scott Elengold, Note, An Inquiry Into Computer System Patents: 
Breaking Down the “Software Engineer”, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 349, 360 
(2005). Most interface patents do not cover the totality of the interface, but 
small parts of interfaces. Id. 
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for interface designs.84 Not patenting interfaces makes sense 
for developers whose business strategy relies upon publication 
of interfaces as a potential generator of network effects, as well 
as for collaboratively developed interfaces, such as those for 
open source projects. 
Even firms with more proprietary approaches toward inter-
faces may still have good reasons not to patent them. For one 
thing, program interfaces can often be protected quite effective-
ly as trade secrets.85 Because commercially distributed pro-
grams are typically shipped in machine-executable form, pro-
gram interfaces are not readily discernible when running the 
program through its various tasks. Trade secrecy is a much 
cheaper and easier means of getting IP protection for an inter-
face than seeking a patent;86 it also obviates the need for dis-
closure of any innovation the interface embodies.87  
Trade secrecy can, of course, be jeopardized by reverse en-
gineering conducted by those who want to access interface in-
formation, but firms can and often do try to counteract this risk 
by inserting antireverse engineering clauses into their license 
agreements,88 or by obfuscating the design to make interfaces 
difficult to discern. The more complex a program is, moreover, 
the more difficult it will be to access interfaces through reverse 
engineering.89 If unlicensed parties successfully reverse engi-
neer a firm’s interface, the firm whose products have been re-
verse engineered can change the interface in subsequent ver-
sions, thereby thwarting interoperability by unlicensed firms.90 
Still, some interfaces are patented, so it is worth considering 
reasons why patenting interfaces sometimes may make sense. 
 
 84. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of possible rationales for excluding 
interfaces from patent protection. 
 85. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Econom-
ics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1607–30 (2002). 
 86. See Douglas A. Barnes, Note, Deworming the Internet, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
279, 292 (2004). 
 87. Trade secrecy also lessens the risk that the developer will be charged 
with infringing someone else’s interface patent. See id. 
 88. This is a common practice in the software industry. See, e.g., Samuel-
son & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1626–30. 
 89. Cf. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 30, at 529 (“[R]everse engineering 
an operating system’s program to achieve compatibility in a competing pro-
gram is particularly difficult.”). 
 90. See id. 
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C. INCENTIVES FOR PATENTING INTERFACES 
Interfaces can be costly to develop and may embody signifi-
cant innovations,91 which explains why firms sometimes want 
to rely on patent incentives to recoup investments in these 
technologies. But an even more powerful reason to patent inter-
faces may derive from the strong blocking power such patents 
can confer over the development not only of competing but also 
of complementary products insofar as the interface defines the 
boundaries between ICT systems. 92  
Interface patents are also valuable to their developers be-
cause it may be impossible to work around them.93 Even a very 
narrowly drawn interface patent may preclude interoperability 
as to key functions.94 Detecting infringement of interface pa-
tents is generally easier than of other software patents because 
if unlicensed products successfully interoperate with the paten-
tee’s products, they likely infringe.95 The exclusionary power of 
interface patents is, moreover, strong even if the technical de-
sign disclosed in the patent is only modestly innovative or an 
 
 91. See, e.g., William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol Li-
cense, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 332, 335, 354 (2008), available at http:// 
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/16/ 
LRColl2008n16Page&Childers.pdf (characterizing Microsoft’s Active Directory 
interfaces as innovative, distinctive, and costly). 
 92. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1401, 1422 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (providing that the developer of a comple-
mentary product infringed an interface patent). 
 93. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2016 (2007) (discussing the holdup problem 
arising from an inability to design around a patent on a component of a multi-
component technology). 
 94. See, e.g., BAKELS & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 77, at 21–22 (giving an 
example of reverse engineering patents). Narrowly drawn interface patents 
have an advantage over broadly written interface patents because narrow pa-
tents are generally easier to defend against invalidity challenges. See id. 
 95. Patents on internal designs of programs (e.g., algorithms) are, by con-
trast, often difficult to enforce offensively (i.e., to stop competitors from using 
them) because such designs are typically difficult to discern from executing 
commercially distributed object code. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. 
Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2005). Although 
firms often seek patents for internal design components, patents on such inno-
vations are generally more useful for defensive than for offensive purposes. 
See id. at 31–43. That is, developers tend to seek patents on such internal de-
sign elements to assure themselves of having the freedom to operate in devel-
oping software embodying these inventions as well as to build a portfolio of IP 
assets so that the firms will have something to trade (e.g., by cross-licensing) if 
a competitor asserts patent claims against them. See id. 
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arbitrary variation on an existing technique.96 This means that, 
absent contractual commitments or licensing obligations such 
as those that may be imposed by standard setting organiza-
tions (SSOs),97 firms can usually charge higher royalty rates for 
licensing interface patents than for licensing other patents, re-
gardless of the degree of innovation the interface patents may 
embody.98 For these reasons, interface patents are among the 
most valuable patents that ICT developers can own.  
Another incentive to patent interfaces may derive from a 
perception that other forms of IP protection for interfaces are 
weaker than patents. Insofar as outsiders can reverse engineer 
ICT systems to gain access to interfaces, trade secrets in the in-
terfaces may be vulnerable to appropriation.99 Determined re-
verse engineers may be motivated to discover obscure aspects of 
interfaces.100 The enforceability of license restrictions on re-
verse engineering has, moreover, been widely questioned.101 Al-
though copyright law protects program code, any interfaces 
embedded in programs are beyond the scope of copyright’s pro-
tection.102 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sega explicitly 
suggested that patents may be the only effective way to protect 
the functional requirements for achieving interoperability.103 
Neither the PTO nor the courts seem to require much disclo-
sure from developers of ICT interface techniques.104 Firms may 
 
 96. See, e.g., Maureen O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent 
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1218 (2000) (noting that many interfaces are 
arbitrary, obvious, and of low intrinsic value). 
 97. See infra Part II.E. 
 98. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 93, at 2009 (“[T]he patent 
holder can demand almost five times as much money once the industry has 
made irreversible investments.”); O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1218 (“The crea-
tion of some interfaces may entail large costs and an interface may be valuable 
compared to others in the market.”). 
 99. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 5.02[1] (1998). 
 100. Id. § 4.04[4]; see also Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1587 
n.49–50. 
 101. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1626–30 (reviewing the 
controversy over the enforceability of antireverse engineering clauses and why 
most scholars think such clauses should not be enforced, particularly in mass-
market licenses).  
 102. See infra notes 150–152 and accompanying text. 
 103. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 104. See, e.g., In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 982 F.2d 1527, 
1532–39 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (rejecting challenges to an interface patent based on 
the inadequacy of written description and best mode disclosure requirements 
of patent law); see also Cohen et al., supra note 76, at 18 (“[T]he Federal Cir-
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thus be able to get patents on some aspects of their interfaces 
while at the same time maintaining detailed specifications of 
the interfaces as trade secrets.105 
Established firms are more likely than entrepreneurs to 
patent interfaces to gain control over the development of com-
patible systems. Entrepreneurs may sometimes seek patents on 
interfaces to attract venture capital.106 Yet, patented interfaces 
owned by entrepreneurial firms are unlikely to confer substan-
tial market power because these firms will generally need to li-
cense such patents on reasonable terms to entice others to de-
velop products or services for their platform.107  
Incentives to seek patents for interfaces may, of course, 
change over time. While a startup might be willing to disclose 
 
cuit does not require would-be patentees of software inventions to disclose . . . 
very much at all about their inventions.”). 
 105. Software developers cannot seek patent protection for documents de-
tailing interface specifications, as such documents would be ineligible for pa-
tent protection as “printed matter.” See, e.g., In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 668–
69 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding a novel method of arranging surnames by phonetic 
groupings to be unpatentable subject matter). Although copyright protection 
might be available to an original comprehensive listing of interface details, the 
scope of this copyright would be very thin, for implementation of the interface 
in an independently developed program would not infringe copyright in the 
listings under established caselaw. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992); Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524. 
 106. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Soft-
ware Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 973 (2007) (arguing that software patents 
facilitate the financing of startup firms). Some venture capitalists, however, 
regard software patents as a drag on innovation in the software industry. See 
Abolish Software Patents, http://www.feld.com/wp/archives/2006/04/abolish-
software-patents.html (Apr. 10, 2006).  
 107. U.S. Patent No. 6,125,391, issued in 2000 to Bart Meltzer et al., is an 
example of an interface patent issued to entrepreneurs. See generally U.S. Pa-
tent No. 6,125,391 (filed Oct. 16, 1998).  This patent covered key aspects of In-
ternet business transaction exchanges and was an important asset for a small 
start-up company, Veo Systems, Inc., that made Veo an attractive acquisition 
target for Commerce One, which was building an e-commerce platform. Cus-
tomers of Commerce One’s platform obtained a royalty-free perpetual license 
to practice the invention; interface protocols and XML sample documents were 
available under open licenses. See, e.g., John Markoff, Auction of Internet 
Commerce Patents Draws Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at C4. When 
Commerce One went bankrupt, however, these patents were the most valuable 
asset that Commerce One owned. See id. A bankruptcy auction brought in over 
$15 million for them. See Lorie Long, Hanging on for Dear Life, BLUE RIDGE 
BUS. J., Feb. 2005, available at http://www.bizjournal.com/content/article 
.php?id=1. Although there was concern within the industry that these patents 
had been obtained by a “patent troll,” it later came out that Novell purchased 
them and dedicated them to a patent commons. See, e.g., John Markoff, Secre-
tive Buyer of Some E-Commerce Patents Turns Out to Be Novell, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 5, 2005, at C3. 
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interfaces to attract customers and partners, when its ICT sys-
tem becomes successful in the marketplace, the same firm may 
become increasingly proprietary about its interfaces and more 
inclined to seek patents for extensions of existing interfaces or 
for new ones.108 Exerting proprietary control over interfaces is 
also more likely as growth of the platform flattens, and its de-
veloper makes fewer investments in potentially disruptive in-
novations and more in maintaining control over the existing 
market. 
D. EXAMPLES OF INTERFACE PATENTS  
One ICT interface patent that was exercised to block the 
development of interoperable technologies was Nintendo’s pa-
tent for a relatively high-level design for a program-to-program 
interface for its Nintendo Entertainment System (NES).109 The 
NES included a game console, a monitor, and controls to allow 
users to operate games played on the console.110 Nintendo de-
veloped games for its platform, but also licensed some other 
firms to do the same.111  Loaded onto the NES console was an 
initialization program called 10NES, which served as an au-
thentication protocol so that only Nintendo’s games or those li-
censed by Nintendo could successfully be played on the NES 
platform.112 Nintendo-authorized game cartridges contained a 
program that interacted with the 10NES program and pro-
duced a data stream that, in essence, served as a key to open 
the 10NES console lock so that games could be played.113   
Through a combination of reverse and social engineer-
ing,114 Atari Games figured out how to generate a data stream 
that would allow its games to run on the NES console. After 
Atari Games began selling these games, Nintendo successfully 
charged it with infringement of its patent on a system for de-
termining authenticity of an external memory used in an in-
 
 108. Patents on interfaces may amplify the network effects noted above. 
See e.g., BAKELS & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 77, at 22. 
 109. See U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635 (filed Dec 23, 1985). 
 110. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1402, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
 111. See id. at 1403. 
 112. See id. at 1402–03. 
 113. See id. 
 114. The social engineering occurred when an Atari Games lawyer ob-
tained a copy of the 10NES source code by misrepresenting to the Copyright 
Office the firm’s need for the program code for litigation purposes. See id. at 
1402–03.  
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formation processing apparatus.115 By patenting this authenti-
cation technique, Nintendo was able to exclude Atari Games 
from making compatible products for its console and obtain 
damages for the latter’s infringing uses.116 
Sega Enterprises, a fierce competitor of Nintendo’s, li-
censed a patent on a Trade Mark Security System (TMSS) in-
terface technique which it then embedded in its Genesis video 
game system in a similar effort to prevent unlicensed video-
game developers from producing games compatible with its 
popular console.117 In Sega Enter., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit explained: 
When a game cartridge is inserted, the microprocessor contained in 
the Genesis III searches the game program for four bytes of data con-
sisting of the letters “S-E-G-A” (the “TMSS initialization code”). If the 
Genesis III finds the TMSS initialization code in the right location, 
the game is rendered compatible and will operate on the console. In 
such case, the TMSS initialization code then prompts a visual display 
for approximately three seconds which reads “PRODUCED BY OR 
UNDER LICENSE FROM SEGA ENTERPRISES LTD.”118 
The Sega decision is mainly known for its ruling that Acco-
lade made fair use of Sega’s copyrighted programs when it dis-
assembled them to discern information necessary to make Ge-
nesis-compatible games.119 However, Sega also sued Accolade 
for trademark infringement because the Sega trademark 
popped up when Accolade’s games were played on the Genesis 
console. Because TMSS was essential to achieving interopera-
 
 115. See id. Atari Games sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringe-
ment as to both copyright and patent infringement claims in response to a 
threat of litigation by Nintendo. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 
Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 835–37 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Nintendo counterclaimed for copy-
right and patent infringement, the former claim based in part on the interme-
diate copying of Nintendo code in the course of reverse engineering. Id. The 
Federal Circuit upheld Atari’s fair-use defense as to reverse engineering done 
for purposes of achieving compatibility with current versions of the 10NES 
program, but not as to reverse engineering to achieve compatibility with those 
parts of the 10NES program that might be used to thwart compatibility in the 
future. See id. at 839–40. The lower court subsequently granted summary 
judgment to Nintendo on patent claims. See Atari Games, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1414. 
 116. The court concluded that Atari Games was a contributory infringer, 
not a direct infringer, of this patent. See Atari Games, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1414; 
see also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigi-
lantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1091, 1101 (1995) (discussing both the patent and copyright claims in 
Atari Games at length).  
 117. See U.S. Patent No. 4,462,076 (filed June 4, 1982).  
 118. 977 F.2d 1510, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992).  
 119. See id. at 1520–27. 
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bility with the Sega platform, the Ninth Circuit ruled there was 
no trademark infringement.120 Had Sega owned the patent on 
TMSS, it would have been able to stop Accolade from making 
games for its platform. 
Patents on communications protocols have had powerful 
exclusionary effects in other litigated cases involving widely 
used ICTs. One was a patent on an improved method for con-
trolling modes of modem operations that Hayes Microcomputer 
used in its SmartModem products which became a de facto 
standard in the modem market.121 Not only did software devel-
opers have to implement this protocol when developing soft-
ware to interoperate with Hayes’ modems, but so did rival pro-
ducers of modems. Modems are used to modulate and 
demodulate signals, both analog and digital, that enable com-
munications between telephones and computers. Modems have 
two modes: a transparent mode in which the modem performs 
its modulation-demodulation functions, and a command mode 
in which modems respond to predetermined commands and 
perform operations by executing instructions in firmware.122 
Hayes arbitrarily designated as “+++_” as the predetermined 
command that instructed the modem when to switch between 
transparent and command modes. Ven-Tel was one of 125 mod-
em manufacturers whose modems were compatible with this 
feature of Hayes’ modems. Although Ven-Tel challenged the va-
lidity of this patent, a jury upheld it and found infringement. 
The Federal Circuit then affirmed the verdict and issuance of 
an injunction.123  
Also successful was Verizon Services’ lawsuit against Vo-
nage over a patented interface technique.124 Vonage began pro-
 
 120. Id. at 1528–30. Sega was a licensee of the TMSS patent, not its owner, 
so Sega did not bring a patent infringement suit against Accolade for the lat-
ter’s use of the TMSS. Id. at 1524 n.7. 
 121. U.S. Patent No. 4,549,302 (filed Oct. 11, 1983). The patent and some of 
its claims are discussed in In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods, Inc., 982 F.2d 
1527, 1531–32 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1530.  
 124. See generally Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Vonage was also sued by AT&T and Sprint Nextel for 
infringing patents on methods and systems related to interconnecting tradi-
tional telephone calls with Internet-protocol networks. See Martyn Williams, 
AT&T and Vonage End Patent Feud, PC WORLD, Dec. 23, 2007, http://www 
.pcworld.com/article/140800/atandt_vonage_end_patent_feud.html. Qualcomm 
and Nokia have just recently settled litigation over licensing terms for essen-
tial patents compliant with the standards of the European Telecommunica-
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viding Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephone service to 
customers in 2002; by the time Verizon sued it for patent in-
fringement, Vonage had 2.2 million customers.125 Verizon’s pa-
tents covered methods of enhanced translation of telephone 
numbers into and from Internet Protocol addresses, which faci-
litated more effective interconnection of VoIP services with tel-
ephone network services.126 A jury ruled against Vonage’s chal-
lenge to the patents’ validity and awarded Verizon $58 million 
in damages.127 The trial judge stayed injunctive relief, pending 
Vonage’s appeal.128 The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of 
infringement as to two of the patents,129 although remanding 
the case for reassessment of damages;130 yet, it affirmed the is-
suance of an injunction.131 Within the Internet telephony com-
munity, concerns arose about the implications of Verizon’s pa-
tents for VoIP services more generally.132 
Although Microsoft has not sued anyone for infringement 
of its interface patents, it has sought and obtained a substan-
tial number of patents on protocols for its computer programs 
in recent years. It holds, for example, over sixty-five U.S. pa-
tents and more than ten European patents on work group serv-
 
tions Standards Institute (ETSI). See Tatum Anderson, Nokia-Qualcomm Set-
tlement Boosts Sharing, Ends Costly Patent War, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
WATCH, July 31, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/07/31/nokia-
qualcomm-settlement-boosts-sharing-ends-costly-patent-war/. 
 125. See Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1298. 
 126. See id. at 1299. 
 127. See id. at 1301–02. 
 128. See id. at 1301. 
 129. See id. at 1305. 
 130. See id. at 1310. 
 131. See id. at 1311. Vonage relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC in support of its argument that the public in-
terest would be served by an award of damages in lieu of an injunction. Id. at 
1310–11 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) 
(holding that courts have discretion not to issue injunctions in patent in-
fringement cases)). The Federal Circuit was not persuaded. Id. at 1311. The 
implications of the eBay case for interface patents are discussed in Part II.C. 
Vonage was able to make an arrangement with a VoIP network services pro-
vider to carry calls placed by Vonage’s customers. See Eric Bangeman, Vonage 
Hangs up on Verizon Patent Infringement with New Agreement, ARS TECHNI-
CA, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news.ars/post/2007/ 
04/02-vonage-hangs-up-on-verizon-patent-infringement-with-new-agreement 
.ars. 
 132. See Adario Strange, The Future of Internet Telephony Could Hang on 
Vonage Case, WIRED, Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/ 
2007/04/vonage_appeal.  
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er and program protocols,133 and it has applied for numerous 
patents for similar protocols.134 Microsoft relied on some of 
these patents as a justification for refusing to provide and li-
cense interface information to Sun Microsystems and others in 
a case brought by the European Commission charging it with 
abuse of dominant position.135 Microsoft also owns an interface 
patent on aspects of its Advanced Streaming Format (ASF).136 
Some open source programmers wanted to write import/export 
filters for ASF. Because doing so would infringe Microsoft’s pa-
tent, this follow-on software product has not been developed.137 
These examples show that established firms with strong 
market positions and/or market power sometimes seek and ob-
tain patents on interfaces that increase their ability to control 
the development of competing and complementary products. 
The next section will consider various policy responses that 
have been identified for dealing with the exclusionary power of 
such patents. 
II.  POLICY OPTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO INTERFACE 
PATENTS   
In the past two decades, commentators and policy makers 
have proposed a remarkably varied array of policy options to 
deal with the exclusionary potency of patents on ICT interfaces. 
Although owners of interface patents would likely assert that 
they should be free to exercise their patent rights as they 
wish,138 commentators, policymakers, and courts that analyzed 
 
 133. See MICROSOFT CORP., EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES PA-
TENTS AND PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR MICROSOFT WORK GROUP SERVER PRO-
TOCOL PROGRAM PROTOCOLS (2008), available at http://download.microsoft 
.com/download/2/8/a/28a250e5-5b79-4547-9959-346736ed 
7a97/WSPP_Patent_Mapping.pdf [hereinafter MICROSOFT PATENT MAPPING]. 
 134. See id.  
 135. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601; see 
also infra Part II.D. 
 136. See, e.g., Posting of Andy Tai to Advogato, http://www.advogato.org/ 
article/101.html (June 5, 2000, 22:15 UTC) (“Microsoft patents the ASF media 
file format.”).  
 137. Id. (“Microsoft . . . stops the author of VirtualDub, a GPLed video cap-
ture and processing program for Windows, from supporting ASF.”). 
 138. I have yet to find a single article or policy document that endorses the 
view that owners of patents on interfaces should be able to exercise these pa-
tents free of any kind of regulatory scrutiny. The Federal Circuit’s decisions in 
the Hayes and Verizon cases, discussed supra notes 121–131 and accompany-
ing text, are, however, consistent with this position. 
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the impacts of interface patents on interoperability have over-
whelmingly favored some regulation of interface patents.  
Section A reviews proposals to exclude interfaces from pa-
tent protection or to immunize the exercise of patents insofar 
as this is essential for interoperability. Section B considers pro-
posals to adapt or reform patent laws to facilitate interoperabil-
ity. Section C discusses proposals to use liability rules rather 
than property rules as to unauthorized uses of interface pa-
tents. Section D assesses the role of antitrust and competition 
law in regulating refusals to license patents on ICT interfaces 
and/or to supply information necessary to achieving interope-
rability. Section E sets forth several private sector initiatives 
for dealing with patents on interfaces essential for interopera-
bility.  
A. BANNING PATENTS ON INTERFACES OR IMMUNIZING THEIR 
USE 
ICT interfaces may be so essential to achieving interopera-
bility that some believe this justifies excluding interfaces from 
the realm of patentable subject matter. Sun Microsystems, for 
instance, has taken this position in some public policy de-
bates.139 Some Sun executives believe that interfaces affecting 
interoperability should be free from IP restrictions and be 
treated as a commons upon which all comers should be free to 
build.140 Alternatively, some have proposed abolishing software 
patents altogether, which would obviously sweep away patents 
on computer program interfaces.141  
 
 139. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 332–34.   
 140. Interview with Greg Papadopoulos, Chief Tech. Officer and Executive 
Vice President of Research and Dev., Sun Microsystems, in San Jose, Cal. 
(May 8, 2008). This theory builds on the work of Yochai Benkler and Jonathan 
Zittrain who perceive the open and commons-like infrastructure of the Inter-
net as having enabled innovation, competition, and other socially desirable re-
sults. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 106–07 (2006); JO-
NATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 78–
79 (2008); see also Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure 
and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 918–19 (2005). Some pri-
vate initiatives aimed at muting the exclusionary power of interface patents, 
discussed below in Part II.C, are consistent with the commons approach to-
ward interfaces that is essential to interoperability. 
 141. A coalition of nonprofit organizations affiliated with the free- and 
open- source software movements has formed to espouse the abolition of soft-
ware patents. See generally End Software Patents, http://endsoftpatents.org 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (declaring that its goal is to “restore the software 
market to a world run by innovators, not judges”). At least one venture capi-
talist agrees with the gist of this coalition’s arguments. See Abolish Software 
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The European Commission’s recent interpretation of the 
1991 directive on the legal protection of computer programs 
may provide support for the abolish-interface-patents move-
ment.142 In its proceeding against Microsoft for abuse of domi-
nant position, based on that firm’s refusal to supply interface 
information to Sun and others and to license its use, the Com-
mission flatly denied that Microsoft owned any Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) in the interfaces the Commission or-
dered it to disclose to Sun and others.143 The interfaces, in the 
Commission’s view, were “ideas and principles” under the 
Software Directive.144  
Although the EU Software Directive is often viewed as 
having endorsed copyright as a means of legal protection for 
computer programs,145 the Directive is better understood as 
having created a sui generis (of its own kind) form of protection 
for computer programs, especially as regards interfaces and in-
teroperability, under the guise of copyright.146 The Software Di-
 
Patents, supra note 106. There are reasons to question the patentability of 
software innovations as a matter of U.S. law. See generally Samuelson, Benson 
Revisited, supra note 45 (discussing various arguments against patents on 
computer program and other information innovations).  
 142. See Software Directive, supra note 5.  
 143. The Commission’s initial order against Microsoft indicated that the 
Commission did not have enough information about Microsoft’s claimed IPRs 
to make a judgment about the extent of these rights. Cf. Commission Decision, 
supra note 6, ¶ 190 n.249 (“[S]ince the relevant specifications are not available 
for scrutiny, it is not possible for the Commission to determine to what extent 
Microsoft s claims relating to various intellectual property rights are justi-
fied.”). However, the Commission defended its order before the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) by asserting that Microsoft had no IPRs in its interfaces. See 
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶¶ 276–78. 
While it is possible that the Commission may only have been questioning the 
validity of Microsoft’s interface patents, the CFI decision points to the Soft-
ware Directive’s recitals, which refer to interfaces as ideas and principles. Id. 
¶ 276. As I reflected on the Commission’s denial that Microsoft had IPRs in its 
interfaces and the reference to the Directive’s recitals, I generated the sui ge-
neris interpretation of the Directive discussed in this Part. 
 144. Software Directive, supra note 5, at 43; see also BAND & KATOH, supra 
note 18, at 83; W.R. Cornish, Inter-operable Systems and Copyright, 11 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 391, 391 (1989) (arguing that interface specifications are 
unprotectable ideas or principles). But see Ashwin van Rooijen, Essential In-
terfaces: Exploring the Software Directive’s Equilibrium Between Intellectual 
Property Rights and Competition Law, 5 COMPUTER L. REV. INT’L (CRi) 129, 
136 (2007) (“[I]nterface specifications are not excluded from protection as 
such.”). 
 145. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 44.  
 146. I have previously argued in favor of a sui generis form of legal protec-
tion for programs. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the 
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 passim 
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rective gives computer programs an unusually “thick” scope of 
protection as to the underlying structure of programs.147 How-
ever, the Directive defines interfaces necessary for interopera-
bility as unprotectable ideas and principles,148 even though 
they may be very important and commercially significant ele-
ments of program structure.  
The sui generis decompilation provisions of the Directive 
reinforce the thick protection for most internal program struc-
ture because it is illegal under the Directive to decompile a 
program unless the decompiler is trying to get access to inter-
face information.149 In essence, the Council made copyright law 
into a super-strong trade secrecy law as to every aspect of pro-
gram internals—except interfaces.  
Under the Directive, published interfaces, as ideas and 
principles, are in the public domain and available for free copy-
ing. Embedded in program code, interfaces remain unprotected 
ideas and principles, although they can be hidden away if the 
program’s developer distributes its code in machine-executable 
form, as is common in the software industry.150 The Directive 
 
(1994). Within the framework set forth in the Manifesto, program interfaces 
would be industrial compilations of applied know-how eligible for a short pe-
riod of exclusivity, following which others could use the interfaces, subject to 
an obligation to compensate the interface’s developer. See id. at 2326–30, 
2370. Treating interfaces as unprotectable ideas or principles avoids a problem 
that the Manifesto did not address, namely, the likelihood that firms would 
revise their interfaces to ensure continued exclusivity and thereby thwart 
compatibility with unlicensed parties’ products. 
 147. See generally BRIDGET CZARNOTA & ROBERT J. HART, LEGAL PROTEC-
TION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS IN EUROPE—A GUIDE TO THE EC DIRECTIVE 
(1991). For a comparison of U.S. and EU law in respect of protection of inter-
nal structure of computer programs, see Pamela Samuelson, Comparing U.S. 
and EC Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Are They More Different 
than They Seem?, 13 J.L. & COM. 279, 292–97 (1994). 
 148. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 43–44. 
 149. See id. at 45; van Rooijen, supra note 144, at 130–32 (discussing the 
balancing mechanisms embedded in the sui generis provisions of the Direc-
tive). The Directive’s highly restrictive rules about decompilation are in stark 
contrast to the U.S. fair-use balancing approach. See Samuelson, supra note 
147, at 285–92. 
 150. In addition to denying that Microsoft had any patents in its WGS-OS 
interfaces, the European Commission rejected Microsoft’s claim that it had 
protectable trade secret interests in the detailed interface information it 
wished to withhold from Sun and other competitors. See Case T-201/04, Micro-
soft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 276. The logic of the Commis-
sion’s position flows from the Directive having deemed interface information to 
be unprotectable ideas and principles, its having authorized reverse engineer-
ing to get access to these ideas and principles, and its giving very strong IP 
protection to other program internals other than interfaces, such that the 
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contemplates that those who want to develop interoperable 
programs can gain lawful access to these secrets in one of two 
ways: either by licensing the interface information from the 
software’s developer or by reverse engineering the code to ex-
tract interface information. The latter option is, however, only 
available under the Directive if the information is not readily 
available on reasonable terms from the program’s developer.151 
This suggests that the Directive’s intent is not to encourage re-
verse engineering activities, but rather to induce firms to li-
cense interface information on reasonable terms because if they 
don’t, would-be interoperators will be able to lawfully reverse 
engineer the code to extract the information.152 
Another sui generis provision of the Directive protects in-
terfaces from a market-destructive loss of secrecy by limiting 
what lawful reverse engineers can do with information about 
interfaces that they extract. Engineers are authorized to use 
the information to develop an independently developed pro-
gram that interoperates with the reverse-engineered program, 
but they are forbidden from disclosing the reverse-engineered 
interface information to others.153 Each firm that wants to de-
velop an interoperable program must thus undertake the same 
tedious reverse engineering process to get access to interface 
information if it is unable to license the information from the 
first program’s developer. To ensure that the inducement to li-
censing is not thwarted, the Directive also provides that the de-
compilation privilege cannot be contracted away.154  
If, as this Article suggests, the Software Directive created a 
sui generis rule against IP protection for interfaces in the EU, 
it would follow that patent protection should not be available 
for interfaces either.155 European patent law, like U.S. patent 
law, does not allow ideas or principles to be patented.156 Cha-
 
Commission thought trade secrecy would not be necessary for program details. 
 151. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 45. The Software Directive 
makes clear that it is not lawful to reverse engineer any parts of the program 
other than those that contain interface information. Cf. id.  
 152.  Induced licensing has the advantage of getting some compensation to 
the developer of the interface, while at the same time ensuring that second 
comers have the information they need to make their systems interoperable. 
 153. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 45. 
 154. Id. 
 155. The European Patent Office does not, however, interpret the Software 
Directive as precluding patents on program interfaces, for it has issued some 
patents on interface designs to Microsoft. See MICROSOFT PATENT MAPPING, 
supra note 133. 
 156. See BAKELS & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 77, at 28. 
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racterizing interfaces necessary to interoperability as ideas and 
principles would logically mean that the interfaces should be 
regarded as unpatentable under the Directive.157 The Commis-
sion may have had this interpretation in mind when it denied 
that Microsoft owned patents on its interfaces.158  
The Court of First Instance (CFI) decided it was unneces-
sary to resolve whether Microsoft had any IP rights in its inter-
faces, although it assumed for the sake of the appeal that Mi-
crosoft did have some IPRs in its interfaces.159 The issue of 
whether the Software Directive excludes interfaces from patent 
protection has thus been left for another day. 
Program interfaces are far more likely to be regarded as 
patentable subject matter under U.S. law. Many interface pa-
tents have been sought and issued under the very broad con-
ception of patentable subject matter articulated in State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.160 That 
 
 157. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 45. Other functional design 
elements of programs, apart from interfaces, may be eligible for patents. There 
is less need, however, for firms to patent program structure in the EU, since 
the Directive provides such a thick layer of protection for program internals. 
Developers can create such internals without concomitant disclosure require-
ments. Cf. BAKELS & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 77, at 22; see also Pamela Sa-
muelson, Economic and Constitutional Influences on Copyright Law in the 
United States 4–10 (Oct. 20, 2000) (SSRN Working Paper Series), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=234738 (explaining the dif-
ferences between European and American protection of software).  
 158. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 278. 
Reinforcing this interpretation of the Software Directive is a provision in a di-
rective proposed by the European Commission that defined the relationship 
contemplated between it and the 1991 directive: “The rights conferred by pa-
tents granted for inventions within the scope of this [software patent] Direc-
tive shall not affect acts permitted under Articles 5 and 6 of [the Software] Di-
rective . . . on the legal protection of computer programs by copyright, in 
particular under the provisions thereof in respect of decompilation and intero-
perability.” Robert Bray, The European Union “Software Patents” Directive: 
What Is It? Why Is It? Where Are We Now?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11, 
¶ 22 (2005) (emphasis omitted). Thus, if it was lawful under the 1991 directive 
to reverse engineer a program to access interface information and to use that 
information to develop an interoperable program, this provision suggests those 
acts would still be lawful after adoption of the software patent directive. By 
implication, reuse of interfaces could not be blocked by patents because inter-
faces are ideas and principles. Although the European Parliament ultimately 
rejected the proposed software patent directive, see id. ¶ 27, it remains to be 
seen whether the courts will interpret the Software Directive as precluding 
patent as well as copyright protection for program interfaces.  
 159. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 283. 
 160. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel 
Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356–58 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (discussing State 
Street). 
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decision considered everything under the sun made by humans 
to be patentable subject matter as long as it produces a “useful, 
concrete, and tangible result.”161 Program interfaces, as hu-
man-made designs that result in information being exchanged 
across ICT system boundaries, seemingly produced a useful, 
concrete, and tangible result. 
The Federal Circuit has, however, recently repudiated the 
State Street conception of patentable subject matter. This oc-
curred after several members of the U.S. Supreme Court ques-
tioned the Federal Circuit’s overbroad view of patent subject 
matter,162 which was plainly inconsistent with prior Supreme 
Court rulings.163 Seemingly emboldened by the higher court’s 
questions, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) resumed 
its earlier practice of rejecting applications for claiming unpa-
tentable subject matter.164 The Federal Circuit has recently af-
firmed PTO rejections of three patent claims on subject matter 
grounds,165 including one en banc ruling that a method for 
 
 161. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373. 
 162. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite 
Labs., 543 U.S. 1185 (2005), to review the patentability of a method of measur-
ing the amount of a certain chemical in a patient’s bloodstream for the purpose 
of diagnosing the patient with a vitamin deficiency. The Court ultimately de-
cided that the writ had been improvidently granted, apparently because the 
subject matter issue had not been presented cleanly below. Lab. Corp. v. Me-
tabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 926 (2005). However, Justice Breyer wrote a powerful 
dissent, joined by two other Justices, that questioned the Federal Circuit’s pa-
tentable-subject-matter standard. Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 
124, 136–37 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting). He concluded that a literal reading 
of State Street’s standard would lead to the granting of patents for processes 
that the Court has found unpatentable. Id. Several Justices also asked ques-
tions about patentable-subject-matter during the oral argument in another 
recent patent case before it. See Pamela Samuelson, Software Patents and the 
Metaphysics of Section 271(f), 50 COMM. ACM, June 2007, at 15, 18–19. 
 163. See Brief for Consumers Union, Electronic Frontier Foundation, & 
Public Knowledge for Hearing En Banc as Amicus Curiae at 22–24, In re Bils-
ki, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 07-1130), available at http://www.eff.org/files/CU-
EFF-PK-Bilski-Amicus.pdf (asserting that State Street is inconsistent with the 
Court’s patentable subject matter jurisprudence). 
 164. Since 2006, the PTO has rejected numerous applications for failure to 
claim patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Ex parte Yang-Huffman, No. 2007-
2130, 2007 WL 2899992, at *2 (BPAI 2007) (rejecting a claim for a method for 
dynamic configuration of information); Ex parte Gosby & Ito, No. 2007-3941, 
2007 WL 2843739, at *2 (BPAI 2007) (rejecting a claim for a method of docu-
ment analysis and retrieval); Ex parte Gutta, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1536, 1537 (BPAI 
2007) (rejecting a claim for a method for evaluating closeness of two items). 
 165. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that 
a method for conducting arbitrations through the use of legal documents is an 
unpatentable process); In re A.C.M. Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (holding that an encoded signal is unpatentable subject matter). 
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hedging the risk of price fluctuations for commodities claimed 
unpatentable subject matter.166 The Federal Circuit decided 
that for a claim to satisfy the subject matter requirement, it 
must either be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or 
transform an article from one physical state to another.167  
It is too early to know whether these changes in subject 
matter standards will make interface patents vulnerable to pa-
tentability challenges, but this is possible insofar as they are 
for methods of representing data, methods of calculating num-
bers, or methods of information exchange.168 The Federal Cir-
cuit is, however, very unlikely to rule that software innovations 
are per se unpatentable, as they can be tied to machines and 
have transformative effects.169 Consequently, interface patents, 
insofar as they are for technological processes, will probably be 
no more vulnerable to subject matter challenges than other 
technical innovations. U.S. courts are also unlikely to be 
swayed by policy-based arguments for excluding interfaces es-
sential to interoperability from patent protection.170 
Congress could, of course, legislate an exclusion of inter-
faces from patent protection.171 But at this point, there is insuf-
ficient momentum or consensus in the U.S. policy arena about 
the importance of interoperability or patents as an impediment 
to interoperability. It is thus likely that Congress would consid-
er excluding patents for interface innovations in order to facili-
tate interoperability.172 
 
 166. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (abrogating 
State Street). That the Federal Circuit is not yet of one mind about standards 
for patentable subject matter is evident from the five opinions in that case. 
However, it is notable that all but one of the twelve judges believed that Bils-
ki’s method was unpatentable. Id. at 976–98 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 954. 
 168. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 45, at 1032–62 (setting 
forth arguments against the patentability of such inventions). 
 169. The Court might decide that program code is unpatentable subject 
matter and reaffirm the unpatentability of broad abstract algorithms, as in 
Benson. However, functional designs and processes embedded in software, in-
cluding interface techniques, are likely to remain patentable subject matter.  
 170. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 
1295, 1310 (affirming the injunction for infringement of a patent on an inter-
connection technique against the leading VoIP provider, and rejecting the ar-
gument that damages would adequately protect Verizon’s interests). 
 171. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies under Patents on Medical and 
Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789 (1996) (discussing 
congressional proposals to exclude medical and surgical procedures from pa-
tent subject matter).  
 172. In the free and open source software community, there is a strong con-
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One commentator has, however, proposed to limit the exer-
cise of interface patents through use of a fair use balancing 
test.173 A first factor would consider the nature of the alleged 
infringer’s advance of the art, under which makers of comple-
mentary products would be more favored than makers of com-
peting platforms.174 The purpose of the alleged infringer’s use 
would be a second factor, under which reverse engineering to 
make a new product would be more favored than the marketing 
of a direct competing product.175 A third factor would assess 
whether market failure had inhibited licensing, under which 
courts would pay attention to the patentee’s reasons for refus-
ing to license the interface patent or whether externalities had 
produced market failure.176 The impact of a fair use ruling on 
incentives to invest in innovation and social welfare would be a 
fourth factor.177 A fifth factor would focus on how much of an 
advance over the prior art the patented interface innovation 
represents.178 A finding of fair use would in some cases result 
in the alleged infringer’s being able to make free use of the in-
vention, although sometimes the use might be “fared.”179 
 
cern that interface and other software patents are threatening to the viability 
of this sector of the software industry. See, e.g., Amy Kucharik, Lingering Pa-
tent Threats Worry Open Source Experts, LINUXWORLD, Feb. 16, 2005, availa-
ble at http://searchenterpriselinux.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid39_ 
gci1059267,00.html; Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, Soft-
ware Patents in Action, http://eupat.ffii.org/patents/effects/index.en.html (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2009) (providing a compilation of news stories and case studies 
illustrating the impacts of software patents on the software industry, some 
giving examples of software patents that have impeded interoperability). 
 173. See O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1203–09. 
 174. See id. at 1230. 
 175. See id. at 1230–31. 
 176. Id. at 1231 (“[A] refusal to license application developers is more sus-
pect than the refusal to license the maker of a competing operating system. 
Failure to license application developers is both particularly troubling and 
likely to occur when the patentee also competes in the application mar-
ket . . . .”). 
 177. Id. at 1233–34. Prof. O’Rourke argues that there will generally be 
high social benefit with little market harm when the infringer has developed a 
complementary product. Makers of directly competing products would not nec-
essarily be excluded from being deemed fair users, but courts should assess 
the potency of network effects and whether the patentee has already reaped 
substantial rewards. Id.  
 178. In particular, Prof. O’Rourke recommends that courts consider wheth-
er the patentee is exerting disproportionate leverage given the level of innova-
tion in the interface. Id.  
 179. Id. at 1234–35. That is, the fair user would have to pay a royalty to 
the patentee.  
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A third possible strategy for restricting interface patents is 
to allow them to issue, but deem their use noninfringing if es-
sential for achieving interoperability. During the period when 
the European Parliament was considering whether to adopt a 
directive on patenting of software-related inventions, a propos-
al was made that use of any patents that “read” on interfaces 
should be deemed noninfringing insofar as there was no equally 
efficient or effective alternative nonpatented way to achieve in-
teroperability.180 The European Parliament did not adopt a 
software patent directive, so this provision was not adopted.181 
While no similar legislative proposal has been introduced 
in the U.S. Congress, there is legislative precedent for immu-
nizing socially productive uses of patented techniques.182 Sec-
tion 287(c) of the U.S. Patent Act immunizes doctors from lia-
bility for using patented medical or surgical procedures to treat 
patients.183 If a strong social consensus developed in favor of in-
 
 180. The proposed Article 6a provided: “Member States shall ensure that 
wherever the use of a patented technique is needed for the sole purpose of en-
suring conversion of the conventions used in two different computer systems 
or networks so as to allow communication and exchange of data content be-
tween them, such use is not considered to be patent infringement.” See Bray, 
supra note 158, ¶ 22.  
 181. Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, European Parlia-
ment Says No to Software Patents, http://wiki.ffii.org/Ep050706En (last vi-
sited Apr. 28, 2009).  
 182. See H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing that taxpayers, tax prac-
titioners, and related professional organizations would be immune from liabili-
ty for use of any patent on a tax planning method); see also H.R. 5638, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (proposing immunity from patent infringement liability for firms 
supplying repair parts). 
 183. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006). This provision was adopted after the Ameri-
can Medical Association and several other organizations of physicians lobbied 
for immunity after a surgeon was sued for infringing another surgeon’s pa-
tented technique for cataract surgery. Mossinghoff, supra note 171, at 795–97. 
Mossinghoff believes this immunity provision is compatible with U.S. obliga-
tions under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Id. Article 30 of TRIPs allows WTO members 
to create “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent pro-
vided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploi-
tation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third par-
ties.” WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 332 (1971), http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. Because the overwhelming majority of pa-
tents in respect of medical procedures are owned by biotechnology and phar-
maceutical firms, none of which sue doctors for treating patients, Mossinghoff 
argues that § 287(c) does not conflict with the normal exploitation of these pa-
tents. Mossinghoff, supra note 171, at 796–797. But see Emily C. Melvin, Note, 
An Unacceptable Exception: The Ramifications of Physician Immunity from 
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teroperability, Congress might well adopt a similar rule for 
immunizing use of patents as to interfaces essential to intero-
perability.184 
Finally, one commentator has argued that owners of pa-
tents on interfaces should be deemed to have misused patents 
insofar as they use the patents as lock-out devices.185 Ninten-
do’s success in asserting its patented authentication method to 
stop Atari Games from making and selling games that could 
run on the Nintendo platform was, in her view, an unlawful ex-
tension of the patent’s scope since, in essence, it created an un-
lawful tying arrangement between the Nintendo console and 
Nintendo-licensed games.186 The patent covered only the au-
thentication technique, not the games or consoles; yet, Ninten-
do was able to exercise the patent to control the making and 
selling of games for the platform, even though the games were 
not within the scope of the patent.187 The patent on this small 
but crucial component of Nintendo’s ICT system conferred pow-
er over many innovations that were well beyond the patent’s 
scope. 
B.  ADJUSTING PATENT POLICY LEVERS AFFECTING 
INTEROPERABILITY AND OTHER PATENT REFORMS 
There are several ways that patent rules can be tailored to 
lessen risks that patents on interface techniques will impede 
interoperability. One example would be to heighten the stan-
dard of nonobviousness for ICT interface patent claims.188 This 
proposal recognizes that firms may seek patents for interface 
designs for anticompetitive purposes, that is, as a tool for block-
ing competitors from developing compatible platforms (e.g., 
game consoles) and for controlling the market for complemen-
tary products (e.g., videogames that run on the patentee’s plat-
 
Medical Procedure Patent Infringement Liability, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1089 
(2007) (challenging both the wisdom of § 287(c) and its compatibility with 
TRIPs). 
 184. It may be more difficult to justify an interoperability exception to en-
forcement of interface patents under TRIPs, however, because a normal ex-
ploitation of such patents may include licensing them.  
 185. Cohen, supra note 116, at 1182–83. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Misuse of an interface patent would render it unenforceable against 
those who bypassed the lockout system, such as AG. So under Cohen’s propos-
al, Nintendo would not have been able to enjoin AG, even if it literally in-
fringed the patent. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1152–81. 
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form).189 To ensure that patents are being issued only to truly 
inventive interfaces, the PTO could apply an “innovative pro-
grammer” standard to judging patentability.190 Under this 
standard, fewer interface patents would likely issue. 
Although patents on ICT interfaces have not (yet) been 
subjected to a higher nonobviousness standard, patent examin-
ers sometimes do scrutinize some patent applications more 
closely than others. Business method patent applications, for 
instance, are reviewed by a “second set of eyes” as a precaution 
against issuing patents on obvious business methods or on 
overbroad claims.191 Other commentators have shown that 
many policy levers in patent law are available to respond to in-
dustry-specific considerations.192 The PTO probably has inhe-
rent authority to scrutinize interface patents more carefully 
than others. If the PTO came to perceive interface patents as 
potentially being sought for anticompetitive reasons, that 
might well justify a closer look.  
A second, though more indirect, way to tailor patent rules 
to facilitate interoperability would be to treat reverse engineer-
ing of an ICT interface for the purpose of obtaining access to in-
terface information as noninfringing.193 Some commentators 
have recommended allowing firms to reverse engineer program 
code to facilitate the development of interoperable programs, 
even if it was necessary to use a patented invention in the 
course of reverse engineering.194 A number of patent doctrines 
 
 189. Id. at 1152–53. 
 190. Id. Cohen thinks that the 10NES patent would have been invalid un-
der this heightened standard. Id. at 1153, 1162.  
 191. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method 
Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 994–95 (2003) (discussing legisla-
tive proposals to raise the level of scrutiny of business-method patents). John 
Allison and Emerson Tiller mention that The Business Method Patent Im-
provement Act, H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000), initially called for 
heightening the nonobviousness standard for business method patents. Id. 
 192. Burk & Lemley, supra note 75, at 1630. 
 193. It is, of course, a separate question whether reimplementing the inter-
face or other patented design in a follow-on product would infringe the patent. 
With traditional manufactured products, one can purchase an instance, take it 
apart, and study its internal design without worrying about patent infringe-
ment. One cannot reverse engineer computer software, however, without mak-
ing patented components embodied in it. Prof. O’Rourke has argued that even 
reimplementation of a patented interface could be deemed fair use. See 
O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1230–35. 
 194. See Cohen et al., supra note 76, at 16–37. “Reverse engineering pro-
motes the fundamental patent policies of disclosure and enablement, ensures 
that patents will not be leveraged to protect unprotectable components of 
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could serve as possible bases for this policy,195 given that the 
social interest in promoting interoperability is no less impor-
tant in patent law than in copyright and trade secrecy law.196  
Another doctrinal development that would promote greater 
ICT interoperability would be judicial refusal to enforce antire-
verse engineering clauses of license agreements insofar as 
these agreements conflict with public policies favoring intero-
perability in intellectual property law.197 
Requiring more meaningful disclosure about interface 
techniques in any patent for them would also promote interope-
rability. In theory, reverse engineering should be unnecessary 
to discern interface innovations, as the patent should reveal in-
formation necessary for someone skilled in the art to make 
them. However, it is well-known that patents for software in-
novations generally disclose relatively little.198 Firms may 
claim the interface technique at high levels of abstraction so 
that an ordinary programmer would not be able to create inte-
roperable components because the interface implementation 
details are kept as trade secrets.  
To respond to this concern, patent examiners could be more 
rigorous about requiring meaningful disclosure as to interface 
techniques. Yet, for already issued interface patents, some re-
verse engineering may be necessary to extract interface infor-
mation. Such reverse engineering to obtain information that 
should have been disclosed in the patent should not be deemed 
infringing. 
 
software, preserves the balance sought by the intellectual property system as 
a whole, and also helps patentees to enforce their rights.” Id. at 22; see also 
O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1212. 
 195. Cohen et al., supra note 76, at 29–37 (exploring limitations on patent 
protection for experimental uses, implied license, and exhaustion of rights doc-
trines as possible bases for interoperability-based defenses to patent infringe-
ment claims). 
 196. Id. at 27–28. Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley also recommend a narrow 
scope for the doctrine of equivalents in software-related patent cases, to ad-
dress widespread and legitimate concerns about the low quality of patents in 
this field. Id. at 37–56. 
 197. See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1626–30; see also 
David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal 
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 
U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 555–58 (1992); Mark I. Koffsky, Note, Patent Preemption 
of Computer Software Contracts Restricting Reverse Engineering: The Last 
Stand?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1160 (1995). But see Bowers v. Baystate 
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming enforcement of 
an antireverse engineering clause in a software shrinkwrap license). 
 198. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN ET AL., PATENT FAILURE, chs. 7, 9 (2008). 
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Certain patent reform measures could also ensure that pa-
tents on interface designs do not unduly interfere with intero-
perability. Especially useful would be implementation of two 
important patent reforms recommended by the Federal Trade 
Commission and National Academies of Sciences: 1) a reinvigo-
ration of the nonobviousness standard for attaining patent pro-
tection,199 and 2) a more cost-effective way to challenge invalid 
patents than the litigation and re-examination procedures un-
der current patent law.200  
These two reforms are interlinked because when the non-
obviousness standard is too low, some patents will have issued 
that should not have; yet the cost of litigation is so high, that 
some invalid patents may not be challenged that should be. In 
KSR Int’l, Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,201 the Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s test for nonobviousness—which required proof 
of a “teaching, suggestion, and motivation” in the prior art—as 
insufficiently rigorous.202 Unfortunately, many patents were is-
sued under the earlier standard. There is thus an urgent need 
for a cost-effective post-grant review system to allow those who 
have strong arguments about patent invalidity to pursue them 
without the need to resort to lengthy and costly patent litiga-
tion. Post-grant review has, indeed, been a key component of 
the patent reform legislation that has been pending before 
Congress in recent years.203 
While reinvigorating the nonobviousness standard and an 
improved post-grant review process are reforms that are not 
specifically aimed at interface patents, there is reason to think 
that these reforms would be particularly useful to challenge 
“bad” interface patents. As noted in Part I, firms have incen-
tives to seek patents for interfaces, even when they embody tri-
 
 199. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BAL-
ANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10–12 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter FTC Report]. 
 200. Id. at 7–8. 
 201. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). A patent reform reinvigorating the nonobvious-
ness standard would have been difficult to achieve in Congress because patent 
lawyers and various industry groups have profoundly different views on how 
rigorous the nonobviousness standard should be. The Supreme Court’s KSR 
decision, though, seems to have achieved this reform in patent law; there has 
been no effort to reverse the Court’s decision through further legislation. See, 
e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Patent Reform Through the Courts, 50 COMM. ACM, 
Feb. 2007, at 19. 
 202. KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. 
 203. H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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vial or arbitrary differences from the prior art in order for the 
firm to have strong exclusionary rights against others.  
Apportionment of damages based on the value of the tech-
nical contribution of the patented invention might also have 
implications for lowering the risk of substantial liability as to 
minimally innovative interface techniques.204 
C. EMPLOYING LIABILITY RULES FOR USE OF INTERFACE 
PATENTS 
Some commentators and policymakers have called for a 
liability rule approach to patents on interfaces.205 This would 
allow unlicensed persons to implement patented interfaces to 
achieve interoperability as long as these persons offered rea-
sonable compensation to the patentee. A liability rule approach 
can be implemented in a number of ways.  
One commentator has proposed that courts should with-
hold injunctive relief for infringement of patents on interfaces 
essential for interoperability.206 He draws upon the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.207 which 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that courts must virtually 
always issue injunctions in patent cases.208 The Court in eBay 
observed that under traditional principles of equity, injunctions 
should not issue unless the plaintiff shows that 1) it has suf-
fered irreparable injury, 2) remedies at law are inadequate to 
compensate it for the injury, 3) a remedy in equity is warranted 
in view of the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
 
 204. The IT industry has strongly supported apportionment of damages in 
patent cases so that “only [the] economic value properly attributable to the pa-
tent’s specific contribution over the prior art” would be awarded. See Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(b)(2) (2007). This proposal has, 
however, proven to be controversial. See, e.g., Posting of Dennis Crouch to Pa-
tently-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/05/patent_reform_2_1.html 
(May 25, 2007, 07:21 EST).  
 205. For a discussion of liability verses property rules in respect of infor-
mation resources, see Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or 
Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007); J.H. Reich-
man, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable 
Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000). See also Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–11 (1972). 
 206. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. 
L. REV. 39, 104 (2008). 
 207. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
 208. Id. at 393–94. 
 1984 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1943 
 
defendant, and 4) the public interest would not be disserved 
thereby.209  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay, which was joined 
by three other Justices,210 recognizes that some firms nowadays 
use patents “as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to 
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”211 
This problem is especially acute “[w]hen the patented invention 
is but a small component of the product the companies seek to 
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for 
undue leverage in negotiations . . .”212 In such cases, “legal 
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringe-
ment and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”213  
In its amicus curiae brief to the Court in eBay, Nokia Corp. 
focused on the risk that patents on interfaces could impede so-
cially beneficial interoperability.214 The Federal Circuit’s rigid 
rule on injunctions could, it said, “particularly encumber the 
technologically sophisticated industries that fuel the national 
economy’s growth” because these industries rely on “interope-
rability standards—which allow a manufacturer’s products to 
compete with or complement a competitor’s products—[that] 
promote the progress of the ‘useful Arts.’”215 Licenses “typically 
benefit everyone: the patent owner receives a steady stream of 
reasonable royalties from the entire industry using the stan-
dard, and consumers reap the benefit of a competitive playing 
field that would otherwise be severely constrained . . .”216 But 
holders of patents on interoperability standards can potentially 
“hold an industry hostage by demanding crippling royalties.”217 
Infringers of patents on interoperability standards should be 
eligible for compensation under eBay, Nokia argued, but not in-
junctive relief. 
 
 209. Id. at 391. 
 210. Id. at 395. Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens joined in the opinion. 
Id. 
 211. Id. at 396. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 396–97. The President of the EU has reportedly also endorsed 
the discretionary issuance of injunctions in patent infringement cases based 
on considerations of equity. See IBM CORP., THE SOFT IP AGENDA—A VIABLE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PATENT 1 (2008). 
 214. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Nokia Corp. in Support of Petitioners at 4, 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130 ), 2006 
WL 235005. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 12.  
 217. Id. 
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In accord with this argument, one commentator recom-
mends that courts deny injunctions when “1) the infringed pa-
tent claims an infrastructural invention; 2) the infringer is ac-
tually using the patented invention in an infrastructural 
manner; and 3) the patented invention is not reasonably avail-
able through licensing.”218 Patents on interfaces essential for 
interoperability are among the infrastructural inventions that 
should meet this test.219 This proposal aims to be “an action-
forcing mechanism that will motivate patentees to come to the 
negotiating table and rationalize the balance of power once 
they get there”220 because they will no longer have the leverage 
of an assured permanent injunction to obtain excessive rents 
for use of their infrastructural inventions. The public interest 
will be served, he argues, because the invention can be used to 
enable interoperability, but the patent holder will also be com-
pensated for the use. 
Japanese policymakers have taken a different approach to 
establishing a liability rule for patents essential to interopera-
bility. In 2005, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (METI) established a “Study Group on the Legal Pro-
tection of Software and Promotion of Innovation,” which ex-
pressed serious concerns about the exclusionary potency of in-
terface patents.221 The Study Group’s Interim Report noted 
that “[i]n the software sector, which is multi-layered, communi-
cation-enabled and with a tendency to have a lock-in effect on 
users, the granting of patents may create unduly powerful ex-
clusive rights.”222 Even though the Study Group recognized 
that most patents are exercised in a manner that promotes in-
novation, it observed that interface patents posed risks of ad-
verse effects on innovation.223 The Study Group encouraged the 
use of Creative Commons-type licensing for patents affecting 
 
 218. See Lee, supra note 206, at 46; see also Frischmann, supra note 140, at 
956. 
 219. See Lee, supra note 206, at 46. 
 220. Id. at 109. There are two other ways that a liability rule could be im-
plemented as to interface patents. Prof. O’Rourke has proposed development of 
a fair use defense in patent law that might result in a payment of royalties to 
the interface patent holder. See O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1233–34. The U.S. 
government could also exercise its power to practice patented inventions and 
to authorize others to do the same, subject to an obligation to compensate the 
rights holder for the use under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) or under its eminent 
domain powers. 
 221. See ISID INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
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interoperability, but also recommended compulsory licensing 
and enhanced application of antimonopoly law as policy res-
ponses to such patents.224 
Two years later, METI published its “Interpretive Guide-
lines on Electronic Commerce and Information Property Trad-
ing,” which announced that a refusal to license patents essen-
tial for interoperability may constitute an abuse of intellectual 
property rights.225 “[W]here a software provider holding a high 
market share has exclusive rights in connection with the tech-
nology related to interoperability/interfaces (even more signifi-
cantly if such technology has been standardized), this tends to 
maintain the monopolized market conditions and undermines 
the incentives for innovation due to its adverse competitive ef-
fect[.]”226 Whether a particular refusal to license an interface 
patent is an abuse of IP rights will, however, be determined 
through a comprehensive assessment of the facts on a case by 
case basis, taking many factors into account.227  
A third liability rule approach to interface patents was 
proposed during the debate over the proposed European direc-
tive on the patentability of computer-implemented innova-
tions.228 The Foundation for Free Information Infrastructure 
(FFII) urged the European Parliament to adopt its proposal to 
require owners of patents on interfaces indispensable to achiev-
ing interoperability to license such patents on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms.229 
 
 224. Id.  
 225. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE, AND INDUS., INTERPRETATIVE 
GUIDELINES FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INFORMATION PROPERTY TRAD-
ING 192–193 (2007) (Tentative Translation), available at http://www.meti.go 
.jp/english/information/data/IT-policy/interpretative_guidelines_on_ec070628 
.pdf. 
 226. Id. at 193 n.36. 
 227. Id. at 196. METI offered the following examples of potential harm 
from interface patents: patents that implicate interoperability of software 
supporting “critical infrastructure”; “universal software that is widely used in 
our society”; information services “in which particular individuals participate,” 
such as online auctions; and where if the system is disabled by an interface 
patent, it will “damage not only [ ] the developer of the information system,” 
but also the operators of the online business and users of its services. Id. at 
201 n.51. 
 228. See Bray, supra note 158, ¶ 16. 
 229. FOUNDATION FOR A FREE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, PLENARY 
AMENDMENTS TO THE PROPOSED SOFTWARE DIRECTIVES 2–3 (2005). This pro-
posal was not included in the Council’s March 2005 common position. See 
Bray, supra note 158, ¶¶ 27–28.  
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A fourth liability-rule initiative that would affect interface 
patents, although it is not directly aimed at them, is a proposed 
European “Soft IP” right.230 Under it, firms could apply for a 
European Community-wide patent without having to pay for 
the patent to be translated into all EU languages, but the Soft 
IP patent would only give the owner the right to compensation 
for use of the patent, not a right to exclude.231 Lawyers for IBM 
hope that this regime will be adopted and widely used by firms 
seeking patents on interfaces and other software-related inven-
tions.232  
D. INVOKING COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST LAW TO FACILITATE 
INTEROPERABILITY 
Competition and antitrust authorities have sometimes 
scrutinized the practices of dominant firms that have thwarted, 
or attempted to thwart, the development of compatible technol-
ogies. The European Commission has twice invoked competi-
tion law as a regulatory tool for facilitating interoperability of 
ICT systems.233 The first arose when the Commission initiated 
a case against IBM Corp. in the 1980s, and the second when 
the Commission took action against Microsoft in the early years 
of the twenty-first century.234 The latter case resulted in the 
Commission ordering Microsoft to provide information neces-
sary to interoperability to developers of competing technolo-
gies.235 Microsoft was also forced to disclose information about 
its interfaces and license IP rights in them as a remedy for vi-
olating U.S. antitrust laws in the 1990s.236 
Although this Article will discuss the Microsoft cases at 
some length, a brief review of the IBM case is worthwhile, as it 
informed the Commission’s intervention in favor of interopera-
bility during the time that the Software Directive was being 
 
 230. See, e.g., James Nurton, IBM Flies Soft-IP Community Patent Plan, 
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, July 31, 2007, http://www.managingip 
.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=1398998. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Telephone Interview with David Kappos, Vice President & Assistant 
Gen. Counsel for Intellectual Prop., IBM Corp. (Apr. 23, 2008). 
 233. Cf. F.M. Scherer, Microsoft and IBM in Europe, 84 ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. REP. 65, 65–66 (Jan. 23, 2003) (providing an overview of the two 
cases). 
 234. See id. 
 235. Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 299–300. 
 236. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 app. at 269 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
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developed.237 The IBM case also affected the Commission’s per-
ception of the competitive harms likely to flow from Microsoft’s 
withholding of interface information from Sun and others and 
of the likely competitive benefits of forcing Microsoft to disclose 
information about its communications protocols to its competi-
tors.238  
During the heyday of its dominance of the computer indus-
try, IBM bundled its proprietary hardware, software, and peri-
pherals together and treated interfaces as trade secrets.239 
IBM’s insistence that its customers buy bundled systems and 
its refusal to provide interface information to other firms im-
peded the development of interoperable components and sys-
tems.240 Even after IBM started unbundling software and peri-
pherals, under pressure from antitrust authorities,241 it did not 
publish its interfaces, but rather licensed them as trade secrets 
on royalty-bearing terms.242 Although licensing interface in-
formation did facilitate the development of IBM-compatible 
technologies, IBM upset many of its licensees by making fre-
quent changes to its interfaces, which caused the licensees’ 
previously compatible technologies to be less compatible or 
wholly incompatible.243 European competition law authorities 
 
 237. The key sui generis provisions of the Software Directive—the recital’s 
characterization of interfaces essential for interoperability as ideas and prin-
ciples and Art. 6’s authorization of decompilation for purposes of achieving in-
teroperability—were legal innovations derived from the Commission’s Compe-
tition Directorate. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 44–45; cf. Alan K. 
Palmer & Thomas C. Vinje, The EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Com-
puter Software: New Law Governing Software Development, 2 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 65, 71–78 (1992) (providing the procedural history of the Software 
Directive). The initial draft of the Directive did not contain these provisions. 
Cf. id. at 67–71 (discussing the initial drafts of the Software Directive).  
 238. Cf. Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 198–200 (referring to a pre-
vious case against IBM in justifying the order in the Microsoft case); Scherer, 
supra note 233, at 65–66 (discussing similarities between the Commission’s 
case against Microsoft and its earlier case against IBM over delayed disclo-
sures of and changes to interfaces). 
 239. See Maria Lillà Montagnani, Predatory and Exclusionary Innovation: 
Which Legal Standard for Software Integration in the Context of the Competi-
tion versus Intellectual Property Rights Clash?, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 304, 310 n.17 (2006) (“[I]n the earlier IBM cases, more relev-
ance was given to trade secrets law, since IBM, after having integrated acces-
sories, used to refuse to disclose the new interfaces by claiming them as se-
cret.”). 
 240. Id. at 312. 
 241. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 22 n.30.  
 242. Id. 
 243. See Montagnani, supra note 239, at 310–11 (discussing allegations 
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charged IBM with abusing its dominant position by, among 
other things, changing interfaces in a manner that rendered 
IBM-compatible peripherals inoperable.244 IBM settled the law-
suit by agreeing to pre-disclose changes to its interfaces to aid 
other firms in adapting their products in a timely manner.245  
A decade or so after the IBM case, the European Court of 
Justice handed down the Magill and IMS Health decisions that 
established that a dominant firm’s refusal to license IP rights 
can, in exceptional circumstances, constitute an abuse of domi-
nant position under EU competition law.246 Magill and IMS 
Health establish a four-part test for determining whether such 
exceptional circumstances exist: 1) the IP at issue must be “in-
dispensable for carrying on a particular business,” 2) the refus-
al to license must be likely to “eliminate all competition in a 
secondary market,” 3) the refusal to license must “prevent[] the 
emergence of a new product for which there is potential con-
sumer demand,” and 4) “the refusal [was] not objectively justi-
fied.”247  
The Commission applied and adapted this test in its com-
petition law proceeding against Microsoft in the early 2000s.248 
 
that IBM had engaged in predatory innovation); see also In re IBM Peripheral 
EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (pe-
ripheral makers charged that IBM’s changes to interfaces were anticompeti-
tive because they thwarted compatible products). Industry groups made simi-
lar claims against Microsoft to the EC. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. 
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 282. 
 244. See Montagnani, supra note 239, at 310–11. 
 245. IBM also tried to block firms, notably Fujitsu, from developing plat-
forms capable of interoperating with applications written for IBM computers. 
See BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 27–28. IBM twice charged Fujitsu with 
unlawful copying of IBM programs, including interfaces, although the cases 
settled. See, e.g., Stork, supra note 44, at 243–47. IBM’s ability to prosper 
notwithstanding its facilitation of Fujitsu’s competing platform seems to have 
given the Commission confidence that requiring Microsoft to supply interface 
information to its competitors would not undermine its ability to recoup its 
R&D investments. Cf. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. 
II-3601 ¶ 709–11 (“IBM’s commitment to the Commission in 1984 was not 
substantially different from what Microsoft was ordered to do.”). 
 246. Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039, I-
5087–88; Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 
1995 E.C.R. I-743, I-759 (the “Magill” case). 
 247. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 116; 
see also François Lévêque, Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: In-
teroperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND 
COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 103, 104 (François Lévêque & Howard 
Shelanski eds., 2005) (providing the Magill/IMS Health test). 
 248. The Commission adapted the Magill/IMS test in that it focused on 
the refusal to license as an impediment to the development of new features 
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Microsoft was charged with abuse of dominant position because 
it was unwilling to supply enough information and supporting 
technologies to enable Sun Microsystems to adapt its Solaris 
WGS-OS so that it could be fully compatible with Microsoft’s 
Windows-based OS technologies, especially as to the Active Di-
rectory technologies that include protocols for synchronizing 
operations among various domains, including efficient ex-
changes of update information, in distributed networked envi-
ronments.249 The Commission asserted that Microsoft had pre-
viously supplied a relatively high level of interface information 
to makers of WGS-OS technologies and that Microsoft had the-
reafter withheld similar information in order to gain additional 
market share at the expense of its rivals, thereby abusing its 
dominant position.250 
In March of 2004, the Commission found that Microsoft 
had a dominant position in the PC-OS market and that the in-
formation that Sun had sought from Microsoft was indispensa-
ble to Sun’s ability to remain a viable competitor in the WGS-
OS market.251 The Commission believed that Microsoft’s refusal 
 
rather than to the emergence of a new product. See Lévêque, supra note 247, 
at 104–08 (discussing this adaptation). 
 249. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶¶ 2–20. Although the Commission relied heavily on Magill and IMS Health, 
the Commission’s charges were not based on Microsoft’s unwillingness to li-
cense its IPRs in the interfaces, but rather its unwillingness to supply detailed 
interface information to Sun and others. Cf. id. ¶ 2 (describing Sun Microsys-
tems’ request for “reference implementation and such other information as is 
necessary to insure, without reverse engineering, that COM objects and the 
complete set of Active Directory technologies will run in full compatible fa-
shion on Solaris”). For a discussion of the Active Directory technologies and 
the amount of disclosure required to implement them, see Page & Childers, 
supra note 91, at 341–43. 
 250. See Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 157–58. Sun and other 
makers of UNIX-based WGS-OS systems had initially obtained access to Win-
dows interface information through a license Microsoft granted to AT&T to 
facilitate UNIX compatibility with Windows technologies at a time when Mi-
crosoft was not in the WGS-OS market. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v 
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶¶ 569–73. Once Microsoft entered that market, 
it no longer had the same incentive to supply detailed interface information to 
AT&T, and that license was not renewed. See id. at 573. As Page & Childers 
note, Microsoft had never disclosed to AT&T or any other firm the then-newly 
developed Active Directory technologies, access to which Sun sought in 1998. 
Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 338–39. Information supplied under the 
AT&T license facilitated emulation of the Windows NT server software, an 
earlier generation technology. Id. at 339. 
 251. Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 146, 294. The Commission also 
ruled against Microsoft on a separate charge as to abuse of dominant position 
in respect to its media player software. Id. at 294–95.  
 2009] PATENTS ON INTERFACES 1991 
 
to supply this information threatened to eliminate competition 
in the WGS-OS market because of powerful network effects 
that were tipping this market to Microsoft’s product.252 It cited 
evidence that customers preferred many features of other 
WGS-OS systems; yet, Microsoft had an advantage over Sun 
because customers also valued compatibility with Windows 
technologies.253 Although there was no separate product whose 
emergence was being thwarted by Microsoft’s product, as in 
Magill, the Commission adapted the Magill/IMS Health new 
product test by concluding that Microsoft’s refusal to supply in-
teroperability information was undermining Sun’s ability to 
develop new features for its WGS-OS.254 The Commission con-
cluded that Microsoft had not shown that incentives to invest 
in innovation in the WGS-OS market as a whole would be un-
dermined if Microsoft supplied the requested interface informa-
tion.255  
To remedy this abuse, the Commission ordered Microsoft to 
prepare sufficiently detailed specifications of its communica-
tions protocols to enable Sun and other makers of WGS-OS sys-
tems to achieve interoperability with Microsoft’s Windows-
based technologies, to provide the specifications to Sun and 
others on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms, 
and to update the information promptly as its protocols 
changed.256 Microsoft was also ordered to establish an evalua-
tion mechanism to ensure compliance with the Commission’s 
order.257 
Microsoft appealed the Commission’s order to the Euro-
pean Court of First Instance (CFI), arguing, among other 
things, that the Commission had misinterpreted the interope-
 
 252. Id. ¶ 980. Prof. Lévêque reasons that once Microsoft had attained a 
certain market share in the workgroup server OS market, it would have an 
interest in diminishing the supply of interface information; less interface in-
formation would cause its competitors’ products to interoperate less success-
fully. Lévêque, supra note 247, at 113–14. This, in turn, would cause custom-
ers and ISVs to be concerned about being stranded. Id. The market would then 
tip to Microsoft, with network effects to finish the work of killing off the com-
petition. Id.  
 253. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶¶ 405–09. 
 254. See id. ¶¶ 631, 647. 
 255. Id. ¶¶ 697–98. Professor Lévêque has questioned whether it was ap-
propriate to make Microsoft bear the burden of proof on this issue. Lévêque, 
supra note 247, at 121. I agree. 
 256. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 48. 
 257. Id. 
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rability provisions of the Software Directive,258 that its owner-
ship of IPRs, especially key patents, in the interfaces provided 
an objective justification for its refusal to supply extensive inte-
roperability information to its competitors,259 and that unless 
the company had freedom to choose how to exercise its IPRs in 
its protocols, it would have inadequate incentives to invest in 
research and development to improve its products.260  
The sharpest difference between Microsoft and the Com-
mission lay in their contrasting interpretations of the interope-
rability provisions of the 1991 Software Directive. The CFI cha-
racterized the difference as whether the Directive was intended 
to permit one-way or two-way interoperability.261 Microsoft in-
terpreted the directive as aimed at facilitating one-way intero-
perability, that is, as intended to facilitate interoperability be-
tween the program whose interface information was being 
sought (e.g., the Windows PC-OS) and complementary products 
(e.g., applications designed to run on Windows).262 The Com-
mission’s two-way theory posited that the Directive was also in-
tended to facilitate development of functionally equivalent pro-
grams to the platform in question, such that the platform’s 
competitors could successfully run programs that designed for 
the platform whose interface information was at issue.263  
Microsoft argued that its existing licensing programs al-
ready enabled development of complementary products, which 
is all, in its view, that the Directive was intended to achieve.264 
It objected to being required to give competitors extensive in-
 
 258. Id. ¶ 121. 
 259. Id. ¶¶ 115–24. Microsoft claimed copyrights in interface documenta-
tion, trade secret protection for the interfaces themselves, and patents on 
some communications protocols. See id. ¶¶ 112, 115, 267–73. 
 260. Id. ¶ 274. 
 261. Id. ¶¶ 108, 225–26. 
 262. Id. ¶ 108. 
 263. Robert Hart characterized one-way interoperability as enabling multi-
vendor compatibility and two-way as enabling plug-replaceability. Cf. Robert 
J. Hart, Interoperability Information and the Microsoft Decision, 2006 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 361, 361 (“[T]he Commission’s decision . . . aims to achieve 
plug replaceability—a standard of interoperability to which the EC Software 
Directive does not aspire. Rather, the author’s reading of the Directive is that 
the goal of the interoperability . . . is a more modest one, namely multi-vendor 
interoperability.”). Hart asserted that the Directive was only intended to sup-
port multi vendor compatibility. Id. The text of the Directive, however, does 
not support this theory. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 45. 
 264. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶¶ 118–23. 
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formation that would allow them to “clone” its technologies.265 
Microsoft argued that this forced disclosure would be harmful 
to investments in innovation in the WGS-OS market.266 Micro-
soft itself would have little incentive to invest in innovation if it 
was forced to give its interfaces away to its competitors and be 
unable to benefit from the exclusive rights conferred by IP 
laws.267 Microsoft also contended Sun and other competitors in 
the WGS-OS market would invest less in innovation because 
the Commission’s order meant that they could benefit from the 
fruits of Microsoft’s R&D without doing their own.268  
In support of its two-way compatibility theory, the Com-
mission pointed out that the critical distinction in the Software 
Directive is that between interfaces and implementations.269 
The Directive extends protection to the latter, but not to the 
former.270 The Commission pointed out that “the word ‘inter-
operability,’ by its very nature, relates to a two-way relation-
ship,” and that Microsoft’s definition “is difficult to reconcile 
with the wording of the definition of interoperability [in the 
Software Directive]: ‘the ability to exchange information and 
mutually to use the information which has been exchanged.’”271 
The Commission’s order did not require Microsoft to disclose 
source code, algorithms, or other internal design details of Mi-
crosoft’s technologies, but only program interfaces.272 For this 
reason, the Commission believed that competitors would not be 
able to clone Microsoft’s technologies, but only to interoperate 
with software developed for Windows. In the Commission’s 
view, the order merely required Microsoft to comply with the 
legislatively endorsed policy favoring interoperability embed-
ded in the Software Directive.273  
 
 265. Id. ¶ 110; see also Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 333, 351–52 (as-
serting that the information disclosed to Samba would facilitate cloning and 
explaining the basis for Microsoft’s claim that it would have to disclose certain 
algorithms and other program internals to aid others in achieving interopera-
bility with its Active Directory technologies).  
 266. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶ 111. 
 267. See id. ¶ 668. 
 268. See id. ¶ 670. 
 269. Id. ¶¶ 195–99. 
 270. See id. ¶¶ 225–26. 
 271. Commission Decision, supra note 6, ¶ 758. 
 272. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶¶ 194–206. 
 273. Id. ¶ 710. The Commission took similar action against IBM. See 
Scherer, supra note 233, at 65–66.  That proceeding was eventually settled by 
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Before the CFI, the Commission denied that Microsoft had 
any IP rights in its interfaces.274 It asserted that any copyright 
that Microsoft might claim in interface specification documents 
would not be infringed by other firms’ implementing the inter-
faces in independently written programs.275 It questioned 
whether Microsoft’s protocols were innovative enough to qualify 
for patent protection, although it also spoke of interfaces as 
ideas and principles.276 And the Commission discounted Micro-
soft’s trade secrecy claims because the value in this information 
lay in their secrecy, not in any innovation they might embo-
dy.277 Yet, it also relied upon Magill and IMS Health as prece-
dents holding that ownership of IP rights was not, of itself, an 
objective justification for refusal to license such rights.278  
Responding to Microsoft’s investment disincentives argu-
ment, the Commission asserted that Microsoft would be able to 
recoup some of its R&D expenses from license fees the Commis-
sion had authorized it to charge Sun and others for disclosure 
of interoperability information.279 Both Microsoft and its com-
petitors would, in its view, have ample incentives to invest in 
further improvements in their technologies in order to respond 
to and fuel consumer demand.280 Because Sun and others had 
 
IBM’s agreement to disclose interface information to other firms in advance of 
releasing new systems into the market. See id. This experience informed the 
Commission’s proposal for the interoperability provisions of the Software Di-
rective. See van Rooijen, supra note 144, at 130; Palmer & Vinje, supra note 
237, at 72 n.34. 
 274. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 277. 
 275. Id. ¶ 279.  
 276. Id. ¶¶ 276–78. It is difficult to accept the Commission’s view that 
there was no innovation in Microsoft’s Active Directory technologies, which 
were at the core of the Commission’s investigation, given the substantial com-
plexity of designing protocols for synchronizing updates among domains in dis-
tributed networked environments and the inability of Sun and others to figure 
out how to implement these interfaces without information supplied by Micro-
soft. Cf. Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 335 (characterizing Active Directo-
ry as “one of Microsoft’s most distinctive and innovative server technologies”). 
 277. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶ 280. 
 278. Id. ¶¶ 689–90. 
 279. See Lévêque, supra note 247, at 117–18 (discussing the challenge of 
setting a “reasonable royalty” for this interface information, especially given 
the nondiscrimination requirement).  
 280. Cf. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶ 654 (providing examples of innovations that benefited both the product de-
veloper and Microsoft). But see Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 354 (con-
cluding that disclosure of interface information to Samba would harm Micro-
soft’s incentives to invest in innovation). 
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invested in innovative WGS-OS designs during the period when 
Microsoft was supplying higher levels of interoperability infor-
mation, the Commission believed that requiring Microsoft to 
disclose such information would not significantly dampen its or 
its competitors investments in innovation in the future.281  
In September 2007, the CFI affirmed the Commission’s or-
der, holding that 1) the Commission’s interpretation of the 
Software Directive was sound;282 2) under Magill and IMS 
Health, ownership of IPRs was not, by itself, an objective justi-
fication for refusal to license them to others;283 3) the excep-
tional circumstances required by Magill and IMS Health had 
been satisfied;284 and 4) Microsoft had failed to prove that its 
incentives to invest in innovation would be diminished by the 
order, saying that the firm had provided only “vague, general, 
and theoretical arguments” in support of this claim.285 The CFI 
pointed out that it was standard industry practice to license in-
terface information,286 and that Microsoft itself had agreed to 
provide interface information in settling litigations against it in 
the United States.287 The Commission’s order was, moreover, 
consistent with the Software Directive and the IBM settlement 
in a similar competition case in the mid-1980s.288 Microsoft de-
cided not to appeal the CFI ruling.289  
Since then, Microsoft has disclosed considerable amounts 
of interface information under the Commission’s order.290 How-
 
 281. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶ 658; see also Ashwin van Rooijen, The Role of Investments in Refusals to 
Deal, 31 WORLD COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 63, 69–70 (2008) (discussing 
the investment incentives analysis in the CFI Decision in Microsoft). 
 282. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 
¶¶ 225–26. 
 283. Id. ¶ 678. 
 284. Id. ¶¶ 690–91. 
 285. Id. ¶¶ 697–701. 
 286. Id. ¶¶ 702, 710. Neither the Commission nor the CFI clarified whether 
it was a common industry practice for developers to disclose interface informa-
tion to makers of functionally equivalent products, or only to developers of 
complementary products. The Commission should have provided some empiri-
cal data to support the implicit claim that both kinds of licenses were common. 
 287. Id. ¶ 703. 
 288. Id. ¶ 710. 
 289. See Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Statement on Com-
pliance with European Commission 2004 Decision (Oct. 22, 2007), http:// 
www.microsoft.com/Presspass/press/2007/oct07/10-22MSStatement.mspx.  
 290. See Stephen Castle, Microsoft Gets Record Fine and a Rebuke from 
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at C3 (reporting that Microsoft had pub-
lished 30,000 pages of previously secret source code for the Windows operating 
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ever, the Commission fined Microsoft $1.35 billion for failing to 
provide sufficiently detailed interoperability information.291 
Microsoft and the Commission have also had on-going disa-
greements over the level of innovation embodied in its interfac-
es—Microsoft, unsurprisingly, claims to have developed very 
innovative interfaces, and the Commission has argued they are 
mundane—which might affect the price which Microsoft can 
charge licensees for providing interoperability information.292 
Key differences between U.S. and EU antitrust/competition law 
cast doubt on whether U.S. antitrust authorities would pursue 
or U.S. courts would uphold similar claims against Microsoft. 
One of the theories underlying the Commission’s proceeding 
against Microsoft seems to be that Microsoft’s interfaces are an 
“essential facility” which Microsoft, as the dominant firm with 
control over access to that facility, was obliged, by virtue of its 
market power, to allow others access on fair and nondiscrimi-
natory terms as long as doing so would not cause undue conges-
tion or the like in providing access to that facility.293 
The viability of the “essential facility” doctrine as a matter 
of U.S. antitrust law is uncertain after the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP.294 Even assuming that Trinko did not deliver a 
death blow to that doctrine,295 U.S. courts would likely be more 
sympathetic to Microsoft’s claims that it was justified in refus-
ing to license interface information because of its IP rights in 
the interfaces and that unless it is able to recoup its R&D ex-
penses, it will have too little incentive to invest in innova-
tion.296 U.S. courts have thus far been unwilling to hold that a 
 
system to comply with the Commission’s order, yet the Commission was un-
impressed due to multiple unfulfilled promises to produce the code earlier). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Scott M. Fulton, III, EU Threatens to Fine Microsoft for Lack of Inno-
vation, BETANEWS, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.betanews.com/article/EU_ 
Threatens_to_Fine_Microsoft_for_Lack_of_Innovation/1172764299. 
 293. Lévêque, supra note 247, at 103–10, 120–21 (discussing the Commis-
sion’s essential facility theory). 
 294. 540 U.S. 398, 398–99 (2004) (holding that Verizon’s unwillingness to 
provide certain services to local exchange competitors did not violate the anti-
trust laws). The Court took into account that Congress had already provided 
rules for access and the Federal Communications Commission and state regu-
lators engage in close regulatory oversight of such matters. Id. at 411–13. 
 295. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Refusals to License Intellectual Property 
After Trinko, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1207–08 (2006); see also van Rooijen, 
supra note 281, 63–77 (comparing U.S. and EU case law on essential facilities 
and refusals to deal). 
 296. See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08. 
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refusal to license IPRs to competitors is a violation of the U.S. 
antitrust laws.297  
There is, however, some similarity between the Commis-
sion’s order in Microsoft and the Supreme Court’s ruling in As-
pen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.298 In both cas-
es, there was a history of sharing resources by competitors that 
had grown the market for both; at some point the dominant 
party withdrew from cooperation in a manner that seemed to 
lack an independent business justification.299 It is conceivable 
that U.S. courts, in an appropriate case, would take into ac-
count that network effects in the software industry can tip the 
market to a single provider, not so much because of the intrin-
sic innovation in its interfaces, but rather because network ef-
fects kick in once the developer’s interface becomes a de facto 
interoperability standard. Trinko relies heavily on the notion 
that it is important to preserve incentives to invest in creating 
the market for the facility said to be essential, and that is as it 
should be.300 In network industries, however, network effects 
themselves may provide powerful incentives for firms to invest 
in becoming the de facto interface standard. 
While a refusal to license IP rights has never, of itself, been 
deemed an antitrust violation in the United States, courts have 
sometimes ordered antitrust violators to license IPRs and/or 
disclose nonpublic information, such as interface specifications, 
to competitors.301 The consent decree settling the U.S. antitrust 
case against Microsoft in the 1990s, for example, required Mi-
crosoft to disclose interface information and license pertinent 
IPRs to firms that might want to use them, even though U.S. 
antitrust authorities had not charged Microsoft with having 
 
 297. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Unilateral Refusals to License in 
the US, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 247, at 12, 27–
30. 
 298. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 299. Id. at 609–11. 
 300. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. 
 301. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Domi-
nant Firm Misconduct, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1304–05 (1999) (giving exam-
ples of licenses induced by antitrust oversight). This article was published as 
part of a symposium issue of the Connecticut Law Review on the remedy chal-
lenges posed by United States v. Microsoft Corp. See Robert M. Langer, Sym-
posium Introduction: United States v. Microsoft, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1245, 1247 
(1999); see also SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, ADDRESSING THE MICROSOFT 
CHALLENGE—RESTORING COMPETITION TO THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (1999), 
http://www.manishin.com/pressdocs/siia.pdf (providing a comprehensive anal-
ysis of remedy alternatives). 
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misused any patents on its interfaces or refused to license IPRs 
in its interfaces to competitors.302 U.S. antitrust officials per-
suaded the judge overseeing the settlement to take a “forward-
looking” approach to thwart possible Microsoft efforts to main-
tain the firm’s monopoly in the Windows OS market by restrict-
ing access to interface information.303 
One option that would have given other firms more access 
to Windows’ interfaces would have been to require Microsoft to 
license its source code to those who wanted to make interoper-
able programs.304 Although this would have promoted greater 
interoperability, some expressed concern this remedy would be 
more generous to competitors than was warranted by the anti-
trust violations.305 A second option was to require Microsoft to 
disclose and license interface information to firms wanting to 
develop interoperable technologies. Microsoft agreed to the lat-
ter in settling the U.S. antitrust case.306 
U.S. antitrust authorities and the European Commission 
have been frustrated in their efforts to promote competition 
through forced disclosure of interface information because com-
pulsory licensing of IPRs and/or knowhow, such as interface in-
formation, is challenging as an antitrust remedy. It requires 
close oversight as to exactly which IPRs must be licensed, how 
much detailed information must be transferred, how timely up-
dated information must be provided, and how long the duty to 
license IPRs or supply information will need to last.307 The Eu-
ropean Commission and Microsoft, for instance, disagreed 
about how much disclosure was required.308 Disclosure of inter-
face information under the U.S. consent decree has not accom-
 
 302. See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as 
an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Commu-
nications Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 77, 83 (2007) (discussing this “forward-looking” approach). Some states 
that also sued Microsoft for antitrust violations had sought more comprehen-
sive disclosure of interface information, id. at 84–87, but the judge overseeing 
these cases rejected the more expansive interface disclosure request. Id. at 
103–08. 
 303. Id. at 83. 
 304. Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent 
the Problem That It Can’t Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1371 (1999). 
 305. Id. at 1372. 
 306. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 171–72 (D.D.C. 
2002).  
 307. Kovacic, supra note 301, at 1304. 
 308. See supra notes 296–98.  
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plished its intended objective of bringing about more competi-
tion in the PC-based OS market.309 
While remedies in the United States v. Microsoft Corp. case 
were being hotly debated, some commentators were skeptical 
that requiring Microsoft to disclose interface information would 
reduce its dominance in the OS market; in retrospect, this 
skepticism seems warranted. Some argued instead for a struc-
tural remedy, such as breaking Microsoft up into one firm that 
developed OS software and another that developed applica-
tions; the former could then license the OS interface specifica-
tions to the latter on equal footing with other applications pro-
viders.310 Among the difficulties with this proposal was that it 
would require legal authorities to make difficult judgments 
about what “belongs” in an OS and what “belongs” in applica-
tions, which they lacked expertise to assess.311  
Alternatively, some favored breaking Microsoft up into 
multiple companies (“Baby Bills”), each of which would develop 
Windows OS technology and license interfaces to applications 
providers. This might have produced more competition in the 
OS market, but it risked fragmentation of the OS, which 
seemed likely to lead to greater development costs and a loss of 
benefits to consumers and applications developers of a single de 
facto interface standard.312 
Yet another alternative for resolving conflicts over IPRs in 
and disclosures of interface information was invented in the 
mid-1980s during an arbitration of a IPR dispute between IBM 
Corp. and Fujitsu over the OS software that Fujitsu made that 
was fully compatible with (and a functional equivalent to) 
IBM’s OS for its System 360/370 computers.313 Fujitsu had sold 
IBM-compatible OS software for mainframe computers without 
objection from IBM from the mid-1970s until 1982.314 Then 
 
 309. See, e.g., Page & Childers, supra note 302, at 83–84, 126–36. 
 310. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 301, at 1294–304 (discussing proposed 
structural remedies). 
 311. Zittrain, supra note 304, at 1370–71. 
 312. See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz, Breaking Windows: Estimating Some 
Costs of Breaking up Microsoft Windows, 32 UWLA L. REV. 137, 139–40 
(2001). But see Robert J. Levinson et al., The Flawed Fragmentation Critique 
of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 135, 135–38 
(2001); see also STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, A FOOL’S PARADISE: THE WINDOWS WORLD 
AFTER A FORCED BREAKUP OF MICROSOFT (2000) (responding to Levinson et 
al.). 
 313. See Stork, supra note 44, at 242–47, for a more detailed explanation of 
the background of the IBM-Fujitsu dispute and arbitration. 
 314. Id. at 243. 
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IBM charged Fujitsu with having misappropriated IP rights in 
its OS.315 Fujitsu asserted that it had only appropriated public 
domain and unprotectable elements from IBM’s programs.316 
Although IBM and Fujitsu settled this first dispute in 1983, 
key terms were left undefined and the compromise soon broke 
down.317 Arbitration ensued.318 One of the difficulties confront-
ing the arbitrators was that the scope of copyright protection in 
computer programs was unclear at that time.319 Rather than 
attempting to resolve this IPR issue, the arbitrators proposed a 
forward-looking solution, a key element of which was a “clean 
room” approach to obtaining essential interface information.320 
Under the regime established during the IBM-Fujitsu arbi-
tration, IBM, in exchange for an agreed upon royalty payment 
from Fujitsu, was obliged to deliver source code for any new re-
leases of its OS to a “secured facility” operated by a special set 
of Fujitsu employees.321 Fujitsu’s “clean-room” team would then 
analyze the source code and extract interface information.322 
Upon compiling the information essential to Fujitsu’s ability to 
continue to develop IBM-compatible OS software, IBM sent a 
team to review the compiled interoperability information.323 
When it signed off that Fujitsu’s team had only extracted inter-
face information, not other innovations in the IBM software, 
the clean-room team would then transfer the interface informa-
tion to the Fujitsu OS development team so that they could 
reimplement the interfaces in Fujitsu’s own independently de-
veloped programs.324  
In a suitable antitrust case involving misuses of IPRs in in-
terfaces and refusals to disclose interface information, a court 
might want to consider a similar “clean room” and licensing re-
gime as that which settled the IBM-Fujitsu dispute more than 
 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 243–44. 
 317. Id. at 244–45. 
 318. Id. at 245. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 246. 
 321. Id.; see also Robert H. Mnookin, Creating Value Through Process De-
sign: The IBM-Fujitsu Arbitration, 47 ARB. J. 6, 9–10 (Sept. 1992). 
 322. See Stork, supra note 44, at 246. 
 323. See Mnookin, supra note 321, at 10. 
 324. Id. at 10. The arbitrators retained authority to resolve any further 
dispute between IBM and Fujitsu over the exchange of source code and inter-
face information; there were, however, no further serious disputes, as the par-
ties had adequate incentives to cooperate with this procedure. Id. at 11. 
 2009] PATENTS ON INTERFACES 2001 
 
two decades ago. This is admittedly a costly way to facilitate in-
teroperability, but it does have some advantages: it avoids 
wasteful rounds of bickering over how much information the 
firm must disclose and it places some of the burden of obtaining 
the information on the firms that want to develop functional 
equivalent programs.325 
E. PROMOTING PRIVATE ORDERING AS TO INTERFACE PATENTS 
Because many ICT industry participants are aware of the 
high exclusionary potency of interface patents, several private 
sector initiatives have focused on development of policies to en-
sure that patents on ICT interfaces will be exercised so as to 
promote interoperability rather than to thwart it. This is espe-
cially important when an interface technique, such as a com-
munications protocol, is under consideration for formal adop-
tion as a standard. 
One noteworthy initiative has been the policy promulgated 
by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) which requires 
member firms to agree that if they own patents that “read” on 
any standard adopted by W3C that is essential to interoperabil-
ity on the Web, those patents must be licensed on a royalty-free 
(RF) basis.326 The initial impetus for adoption of this policy was 
a claim that the W3C’s Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 
standard infringed a non-W3C-member’s patent.327 Although 
the W3C concluded that the P3P standard did not infringe that 
patent, senior officials realized that the W3C would likely be 
faced with other patent claims affecting its standards. After ex-
tensive deliberations, the W3C decided to adopt an RF policy as 
to standards essential to Web interoperability, concluding that 
this policy was the optimal way to promote the continued 
progress of the open Web.328 
The Organization for the Advancement of Structured In-
formation Standards (OASIS) does not mandate RF licensing of 
 
 325. See Page & Childers, supra note 302, at 112–26 (discussing many dif-
ficulties encountered in determining how much information Microsoft was ob-
liged to disclose under the consent decree). 
 326. W3C PATENT POLICY WORKING GROUP, W3C PATENT POLICY §§ 3.1, 5 
(Daniel J. Weitzner ed., 2004), http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-
20040205/. The policy does, however, contain a procedure whereby one can at-
tain an exclusion from the RF commitment. See id. § 4. 
 327. See Daniel J. Weitzner, Standards, Patents and the Dynamics of In-
novation on the World Wide Web pt. II (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.w3.org/2004/ 
10/patents-standards-innovation.html. 
 328. Id. at pt. III.  
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essential interface patents owned by member firms which be-
come OASIS standards.329 OASIS provides, instead, several li-
censing options. OASIS seems to have been influenced by the 
W3C policy, for it developed more than one RF licensing option 
for TCs operating under OASIS’ aegis; yet, it also allows TCs to 
adopt policies that commit holders of patented technologies 
adopted as standards to license them on RAND terms.330 OA-
SIS now requires TCs to announce at the time of TC formation 
which IP policy they have adopted. Interestingly, the over-
whelming majority of TCs formed since this new policy was put 
in place have adopted RF policies for applications and web ser-
vices standards approved by OASIS.331 Patents on interface 
components of OASIS standards are, therefore, generally avail-
able on RF terms. 
Although RF policies for interface patents do not make 
such patents unenforceable, they substantially reduce the leve-
rage that the patents would otherwise provide their owners as 
well as their economic value. This, in turn, dampens incentives 
to acquire such patents. Free and open source developers none-
theless sometimes object to W3C and similar RF policies, on the 
ground that these licenses include some restrictions that are 
incompatible with the practices of this community.332 
The overwhelming majority of SSOs that adopt standards 
affecting the ICT industry require members who participate in 
standard-setting processes to disclose any patents they own 
that are essential to any standard under consideration by that 
SSO.333 Most also require a pre-commitment to licensing such 
 
 329. See OASIS, OASIS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY § 4 
(2008), http://www.oasis-open.org/who/intellectualproperty-2008-05-02.pdf (de-
scribing three IPR modes including RAND, RF on RAND Terms, and RF on 
Limited Terms). 
 330. See id.  
 331. Interview with Robert J. Glushko, OASIS Board Member, in Berkeley, 
Cal. (Apr. 22, 2008). 
 332. See, e.g., FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, FSF’S POSITION ON W3 CON-
SORTIUM “ROYALTY-FREE” PATENT POLICY (2003), http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/w3c-patent.html (expressing objection to field-of-use restrictions 
that limit practice of the patented idea to those precisely specified as set forth 
in the license). 
 333. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1904–05 (2002) (implicitly requiring dis-
closure of all essential patents through requirement to disclose all patents 
known).  
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patents on RAND terms.334 So interface patents that have been 
adopted as standards will generally be available under RAND 
licenses, even if not on RF terms.335  
Another private sector initiative that fosters interoperabili-
ty in the patent-intensive landscape of the ICT industry is the 
Open Invention Network (OIN), a patent pool recently formed 
by several major IT industry firms to build a portfolio of soft-
ware patents that support open source software projects.336 
OIN “acquires patents and makes them available royalty-free 
to any company, institution or individual that agrees not to as-
sert its patents against the Linux System.”337 The OIN pool ac-
quires software patents of all kinds, including some that cover 
valuable interfaces.338 Other similar pools seem to be form-
ing.339 Some firms are, moreover, making unilateral commit-
ments not to enforce certain interface patents.340 
 
 334. Id. at 1906. However, there are sometimes disputes about what “rea-
sonable” means. See id. (describing a lack of guidance to what “reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory licensing” terms actually mean). 
 335. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the European Tele-
communications Standards Institute (ETSI) have IP policies that require es-
sential interface standards to be made available on RAND terms. See SCOTT 
BRIM, GUIDELINES FOR WORKING GROUPS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 
§ 5.6 (2004), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3669.txt (describing IETF’s goal of help-
ing a working group choose a technology and offering guidelines for the 
process including proposed licensing terms); ETSI, ETSI Rules of Procedure: 
Annex 6 ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, in ETSI DIRECTIVES 34, 37 
(2009), http://portal.etsi.org/directives/25_directives_jan_2009.pdf. ETSI de-
fines ESSENTIAL as: ‘ESSENTIAL’ as applied to IPR means that it is not 
possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking into account nor-
mal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the time 
of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or op-
erate EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply with the STANDARD with-
out infringing that IPR. ETSI IPR Policy FAQs, http://www.etsi.org/ 
website/AboutETSI/LegalAspects/IPR_Policy_FAQ.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 
2009). 
 336. See Open Invention Network, About OIN, http://www 
.openinventionnetwork.com/about.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2009); Open In-
vention Network, Members, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/ 
about_members.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). 
 337. See Open Invention Network’s Patent License Agreement, 
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_license.php (last visited Apr. 29, 
2009). 
 338. The Meltzer patent, discussed supra note 107, for example, is part of 
the OIN pool. See Open Invention Network’s Currently Owned Patents, http:// 
www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_owned.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). 
 339. See, e.g., François Lévêque & Yann Ménière, Copyrights Versus Pa-
tents: The Open Source Software Legal Battle, 4 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPY-
RIGHT ISSUES 27, 42–43 (2007); Hank Barry, Attorney, Howard Rice Neme-
rovski Canady Falk & Rabkin, Presentation at the Berkeley Center for Law & 
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In addition to the patent pools and unilateral commitments 
mentioned above, it is a common practice in the ICT industry 
for firms to cross-license their patent portfolios.341 Some inter-
face patents are within these portfolios. The pervasiveness of 
cross-licenses in the ICT industry is yet another check on po-
tentially abusive exercise of patents. These and other private 
initiatives cannot, of course, blunt the force of all interface pa-
tents that might impede interoperability, which is why some 
nations have adopted or considered more interventionist strat-
egies. 
III.  WHAT IS THE RIGHT POLICY RESPONSE TO 
INTERFACE PATENTS ESSENTIAL TO 
INTEROPERABILITY?   
Anyone who reviews the extensive literature discussing 
policy options for responding to the exclusionary potency of ICT 
interface patents would get the impression that patents on in-
terfaces must be very serious impediments to interoperability. 
Part II has shown that this literature offers more than twenty-
five suggestions for regulating interface patents in order to 
achieve more compatibility among ICT systems. Within this 
framing, the only question seems to be which of the many op-
tions would best accomplish this objective.  
If one begins the inquiry instead by surveying the vast ar-
ray of ICT systems deployed in the modern world, it becomes 
evident that interoperability is prevalent, even if not ubiquit-
 
Technology Symposium: Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship Confe-
rence (Mar. 8, 2008). 
 340. Lévêque & Ménière, supra note 339. Sun and Microsoft, for instance, 
have cross-licensed their patent portfolios. See, e.g., Press Release, Microsoft 
Corp., Microsoft and Sun Microsystems Enter Broad Cooperation Agreement: 
Settle Outstanding Litigation (Apr. 2, 2004), http://www.microsoft.com/ 
presspass/press/2004/apr04/04-02SunAgreementPR.mspx. Sun could, there-
fore, have lawfully implemented the Active Directory protocols at issue in the 
European Commission’s action against Microsoft without worrying about pa-
tent infringement; the problem was that Sun did not have access to the rele-
vant interface information, not that Microsoft had refused to license the pa-
tents. E-mail from David Heiner, Vice President & Deputy Gen. Counsel, 
Microsoft Corp., to the author (May 13, 2008) (on file with the author). 
 341. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 95, at 35–36 & n.123, 
73–74; Robert P. Merges, IP Rights and Technological Platforms (Berkeley 
Ctr. for Law & Tech., Working Paper No. 64, 2008), http://repositories.cdlib 
.org/bclt/lts/64/ (proposing that many market factors provide incentives for in-
teroperability and arguing that ex post measures are superior to ex ante regu-
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ous.342 Market incentives, driven in large part by the potential 
for generating network effects, are often strong enough to in-
duce many firms either to publish ICT interfaces without IP re-
strictions or to license interface information on reasonable 
terms. Many interface patents are licensed through cross-
licensing arrangements common in ICT industries. Insofar as 
SSOs have adopted patented interfaces as standards, licenses 
are likely to be available under either RF or RAND terms.343 
The more fundamental the interfaces are to the functioning of 
key infrastructures, such as the World Wide Web and web ser-
vices, the more likely the patents are to be available on RF 
terms.344 
This is not to say that patents on interface designs never 
impede interoperability. Nintendo was, after all, able to block 
Atari Games from making and selling games for its NES con-
sole because of the patent it obtained for an authentication me-
chanism.345 That case was, however, decided fifteen years 
ago.346 Very few reported cases since then have involved ICT 
interface patents whose exercise was impeding interoperabili-
ty.347 
 
 342. See, e.g., GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 5–9. 
 343. But see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 93, at 2042–43 (suggesting that 
royalty caps or “step-down” royalties are better alternatives to RF and RAND 
licensing arrangements but suffer from raising “antitrust flags”).  
 344. Owners of patents on interface techniques may, of course, not be 
members of the W3C, OASIS, or other SSOs, and hence not committed to the 
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policies may thus not be a complete solution to the interoperability problem. 
When SSOs learn of a patent that might “read” on an interface design that is 
under consideration as a standard, they may be able to design around it. 
There is, of course, greater risk of holdup if the design has already become a 
standard, and industry leaders have already implemented the design in their 
products. In circumstances where irreversible commitments have been made 
to an interface standard covered by an outsider’s patent, courts may award 
reasonable royalties for infringement instead of injunctive relief. See eBay v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(explaining that in similar cases “legal damages may well be sufficient to com-
pensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public inter-
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 345. See supra Part I.D. 
 346. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 832 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
 347. It is possible that some firms have given up on ICT development 
projects because they were unable to license interface patents; it is, however, 
impossible to know how often this has happened. Litigation is an imperfect 
indicator of patents as impediments to interoperability. However, I expected to 
find more cases in which patents were being asserted to thwart compatibility 
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Some anecdotal evidence exists as to open source software 
projects that did not go forward because of interface patents.348 
Yet, even open source projects have been able to implement 
some patented interfaces. Samba and Microsoft, for example, 
were able to reach an agreement on Samba’s use of certain 
network communications protocols.349 (Of course, Microsoft’s 
willingness to license these protocols to Samba on GPL-friendly 
terms was due in large part to the Commission’s oversight of 
Microsoft’s interface licensing practices.350) It is a fair inference 
that organizations, such as W3C, OASIS, and METI, would not 
have undertaken their policy initiatives to blunt the exclusio-
nary potency of interface patents if these organizations thought 
such patents would never or only rarely present impediments 
to interoperability. 
Nor is it to say that patents will not become a bigger impe-
diment to interoperability in the future. FFII has expressed 
concern that Microsoft will undo the European Commission’s 
ruling by seeking ever more patents on interfaces.351 Yet, even 
if Microsoft gets more patents on interface techniques, there is 
no reason to believe that Commission will be any more deferen-
tial to those patents than it was to the patents raised in the 
2004 proceeding. Microsoft was not able to persuade the CFI 
that courts should be more deferential to a firm’s refusal to li-
cense technological IPRs, such as patents on interfaces, than to 
refusals to license copyrights.352 The Commission and the CFI 
 
because would-be interoperators would likely challenge the validity of inter-
face patents in hopes of using the techniques if the patentee was either refus-
ing to license the patents or demanding unreasonable terms. 
 348. See, e.g., Andy Tai, Microsoft Prohibits GPLed Work Via Licensing of 
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 350. See Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 333 (characterizing the Micro-
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 351. See Press Release, Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, 
Microsoft Will Trump EU Competion Ruling with Patents (Sept. 17, 2007),  
http://press.ffii.org/Press_releases/Microsoft_will_trump_EU_competition 
_ruling_with_patents (describing recent patents obtained by Microsoft).  
 352. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 693 
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regard competition law as an appropriate means to monitor a 
dominant party’s use of IP to impede interoperability. In the 
United States, courts are more likely to evolve doctrines within 
patent law to respond, as needed, if patents are impeding so-
cially desirable interoperability. 
The eBay decision provides U.S. courts with a basis for 
awarding reasonable royalties to owners of patents instead of 
injunctions for interfaces essential to interoperability.353 This 
approach may be more likely if the patent would block access to 
widely used infrastructures,354 although it is noteworthy that 
the Federal Circuit was inhospitable to Vonage’s argument that 
an injunction should not issue to block its use of Verizon’s pa-
tented interface because of the impacts of the injunction for 
millions of users of its VoIP services.355 In the post-eBay case-
law thus far, injunctive relief has generally been withheld only 
in cases that appear to involve “patent trolls.”356  
It is, however, erroneous to construe eBay as confining 
judicial discretion to withhold injunctive relief to patent-troll-
like cases. eBay held that courts should carefully consider in all 
IP cases the same four factors traditionally used in making 
judgments about whether to order injunctive relief.357 Nokia’s 
amicus brief in eBay made a strong argument about why in-
junctive relief should be withheld in cases involving patents on 
interfaces essential to interoperability.358 Courts should be es-
 
(refusing Microsoft’s argument without the presence of the exceptional cir-
cumstances identified in Magill and IMS Health).   
 353. See supra notes 212–26 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra Part II.C.  
 355. See Verizon Servs. Co. v. Vonage Holdings Co., 503 F.3d 1295, 1310–
11 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A]ffirming the district court’s decision to issue an injunc-
tion . . . .”). 
 356. See Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the 
Emerging Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Pa-
tent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV. 305, 312–22 (2007). Courts may be 
wary of awarding damages in lieu of injunctions because of the difficulties that 
typically attend price-setting by nonmarket actors through compulsory li-
censes, especially as applied to developers of competing platforms. Id. at 342–
43. If an interface patentee deliberately stays outside of a standard setting 
process that is likely to implicate its IPRs in order to avoid a RAND commit-
ment, courts might find this an appropriate case in which to award damages 
but not injunctive relief, as this may be seen as troll-like behavior. 
 357. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“[A] 
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before 
a court may grant such relief.”). 
 358. Brief of Nokia Co. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *2, eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 
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pecially receptive to a damage-based remedy if an interface pa-
tent covers one small component of a complex multi-component 
technology so that, in effect, an injunction would result in 
thwarting interoperability as to components not covered by the 
patent.359 It is also conceivable, although somewhat less likely, 
that U.S. courts will adopt the fair use defense proposal dis-
cussed above to balance the patent holders’ and public interests 
at stake in cases involving patents affecting interoperability. 
U.S. courts are, however, unlikely to rule that a firm’s re-
fusal to license an interface patent constitutes patent misuse, 
even if the claim was wrapped in the language of tying ar-
rangements.360 The U.S. Patent Act specifically provides that 
refusing to license patents is not misuse.361 Nor are U.S. courts 
likely to treat a refusal to license an interface patent or to dis-
close interface information as an antitrust violation, even if the 
license or disclosure is necessary to achieving interoperabili-
ty.362 In the aftermath of Trinko, it is doubtful that U.S. courts 
would regard ICT interfaces as essential facilities, refused 
 
235005 (“[T]he decision below threatens to thwart the innovative and pro-
competitive work of standard-setting organizations.”). 
 359. General Electric, for instance, claimed patent rights in a method and 
system for transferring images from an ultrasound system to third-party sto-
rage and printing systems. See U.S. Patent No. 6,210,327 (filed Apr. 3, 2001). 
Use of that method and system was essential for commercial viability of any 
business of making and selling diagnostic ultrasound machines. GE sued So-
nosite for infringing this patent, although it eventually dropped this claim. In-
terview with Ted Sichelman, Research Fellow, Berkeley Center for Law & 
Technology, in Berkeley, Cal. (Aug. 22, 2008). 
 360. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text for Prof. Cohen’s ar-
gument as to why the Nintendo lock-out system was patent misuse. But see, In 
re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a patentee can lawfully refuse to license third parties who want 
to make replacement parts). One might argue that treating lock-outs as mi-
suse is less likely after enactment of the anticircumvention rules of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act because it privileges use of technical protection 
measures (TPMs) to protect copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see 
Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological 
Contracts, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 297, at 181 
(noting how the DMCA violates content locks). Yet, some cases have inter-
preted the anticircumvention rules narrowly to preclude lock-out TPMs that 
do not cause copyright infringements. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. 
Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We conclude that 17 
U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright 
owners.”).  
 361. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006). 
 362. See supra notes 300–03 and accompanying text. 
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access to which violates U.S. antitrust law.363 Of course, a firm 
that has otherwise violated the antitrust laws may, as in Unit-
ed States v. Microsoft, be required to license patents and pro-
vide interface information as part of the remedy.364 
This Article endorses withholding injunctive relief in an 
appropriate case in which an interface patent is essential to 
achieving interoperability and compensation would allow the 
patentee to recoup its R&D expenses; it also endorses some pa-
tent reform measures discussed in Part II.B. There is, however, 
at this time too little empirical evidence that patents are such a 
major impediment to interoperability to justify adoption of 
stronger policy measures,365 such as excluding interfaces from 
patentable subject matter or immunizing the use of patented 
 
 363. It is certainly possible that U.S. antitrust and patent misuse law may 
evolve to regulate interface patents in the future if such patents emerge as 
substantial impediments to interoperability and threaten the viability of com-
petition in the ICT industry. U.S. courts have given relatively little considera-
tion to the power of network effects in ICT systems and how this interacts 
with proprietary control over interfaces. If U.S. patent and antitrust officials 
become concerned with consumer harms arising from exclusionary uses of pa-
tents, this might justify U.S. policymakers moving toward an EU-style regula-
tion of how dominant parties exercise IPRs. U.S. courts are likely, however, to 
be more concerned than the Commission and CFI were to the chill on incen-
tives to invest in innovation that forced disclosure of interfaces and licensing 
of patents may bring about. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004) (“Compelling such firms to 
share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying 
purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, 
the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.”). 
 364. See supra Part II.D. 
 365. I recognize the dangers of embracing the null hypothesis. Yet, consider 
the paucity of litigation about interface patents and even of anecdotal evidence 
of interface patents as impediments to interoperability. I spoke at length with 
ICT industry experts from small and large firms expecting to find many ex-
amples of patents as impediments to interoperability and was surprised at 
how few emerged. Widespread cross licensing in the IT industry, RF and 
RAND commitments for patented standards, and many examples of successful 
licensing of interface patents support my conclusion that the evidence at 
present of patents as significant impediments to interoperability is relatively 
weak. See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Prop-
erty Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2006) (discussing the 
“widespread use of cross licensing”). It is also worth noting that there is not 
just one software industry, but many software industries focused on different 
market sectors, and many software sector markets are relatively small. While 
an interface patent may be asserted to thwart interoperability in some niche 
markets, the larger or wider the software market, the more likely it is that 
cross licensing or SSO policies will blunt the exclusionary potency of interface 
patents. More systematic empirical research might, of course, identify prob-
lems arising from interface patents, such as allowing patentees to extract 
royalties out of proportion to the value of the innovation. 
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interfaces to achieve compatibility.366 While there are good rea-
sons to question the suitability of patents as a form of IP pro-
tection for computer program innovations,367 insofar as patents 
are available for software inventions, it is difficult to justify 
withholding them from interface techniques, as long as they 
meet patent law’s substantive standards. Interfaces enable the 
development of new features of ICT systems and are inextrica-
bly connected to the innovative features they enable.368  
Even though some interface designs are inventive and cost-
ly to develop, it would be rational for a nation to decide, as the 
EU arguably did, that interfaces essential to interoperability 
are “ideas” or “principles” that should be unpatentable as a sui 
generis matter. Patent incentives may not actually be necessary 
to bring interfaces into existence.369 Developing software with-
out interfaces is like building a house without windows or 
doors.370 Although it can be done, there is little point in doing 
it, as ICT technologies are generally more useful when they in-
 
 366. Excluding interfaces from patent subject matter would likely be diffi-
cult to monitor, as firms would almost certainly encourage their lawyers to en-
gage in artful patent drafting to claim rights in interfaces without designating 
them as such. An immunity from infringement provision as to techniques es-
sential to interoperability would be more likely to achieve its goal. However, as 
noted above, such an immunity provision would risk running afoul of TRIPs 
obligations. See supra notes 188–89. 
 367. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 45, at 1031–32 (“If the 
software industry neither wants nor needs the patent system in order to be a 
vital and innovative industry, then, as a matter of public policy, it is sensible 
not to use the patent system for the protection of program-related innova-
tions.”); Samuelson et al., supra note 146, at 2343–47 (“The dual character of 
computer programs—which are both writings and machines at the same 
time—has presented some difficulties for those wanting to use patent law as a 
means of legal protection for software innovations.”). 
 368. Thanks to Robert Barr for making this point. Barr also pointed out 
that if engineers at SSO technical meetings spend hours debating which is the 
most “elegant” solution to a particular technical problem when setting stan-
dards for interfaces, there must be some innovation that distinguishes one so-
lution from another. 
 369. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1216 (“[B]ecause significant first-
mover advantages and returns larger than those of conventional markets often 
characterize network markets, investors may not need the inducement of in-
tellectual property rights at all to encourage them to fund innovation.”). As 
noted in Part II.A, a decision to exclude interfaces from patenting would likely 
lead to greater reliance on trade secrecy protection. Such a rule would also be 
difficult to monitor effectively since a claim may cover an interface component 
without the application specifically calling it that. Interface innovations are, 
moreover, likely to be tied to feature innovations, and claimed as such. 
 370. See David Orenstein, QuickStudy: Application Programming Interface 
(API), COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 10, 2000, http://www.computerworld.com/action/ 
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=43487 (making this analogy). 
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teroperate with other entities.371 Firms such as Microsoft are 
unlikely to cease developing interfaces or improving interfaces 
if they cannot patent them. The EU could reasonably have de-
cided that software developers would have sufficient incentives 
to develop programs by the expansive protection the Directive 
provides to software internals (other than interfaces) and by 
outlawing decompilation except when motivated by compatibili-
ty considerations. Such expansive protection could provide ade-
quate incentives for software development even if without pro-
tection for interfaces (which, after all, can still be kept secret). 
Although the Supreme Court may revisit the patentability 
of software and narrow its scope,372 this would have little im-
pact on the patentability of interfaces insofar as they are tied to 
enabling product features. The bigger challenge in the United 
States, is weeding out patents on arbitrary or trivial interface 
designs. This may be accomplished through a reinvigoration of 
the invention standard after the Supreme Court’s KSR decision 
and other patent reforms, such as an improved post-grant re-
view regime.373  
While nations should not require interface techniques to be 
any more innovative than other patentable designs, patent offi-
cials would be well advised to examine claims for patents on in-
terface techniques more rigorously than they examine other 
kinds of claims and perhaps to require more meaningful disclo-
sure of interface techniques if substantive standards of paten-
tability are met. This greater scrutiny would be wise given that 
firms have incentives to patent interface techniques less be-
cause of any innovation they might or might not embody and 
more because of their exclusionary potency. 
There are certainly some sectors in which there is less in-
teroperability than one might wish for (e.g., digital music ser-
vices),374 but patents do not seem to be the principal impedi-
ments to interoperability in those sectors. Firms that choose 
 
 371. Id. 
 372. See Pamela Samuelson, Revisiting Patentable Subject Matter, 51 
COMM. ACM, July 2008, at 20, 22 (“If . . . the Federal Circuit reverses the 
BPAI’s ruling in Bilski . . . the Supreme Court will probably review the Bilski 
case to clarify what standards the PTO and Federal Circuit should apply in 
judging which processes are eligible for patent protection.”). 
 373. See supra Part II.B. 
 374. France has undertaken regulatory efforts to bring about greater inte-
roperability as to digital music. See L.C. Angell, French iTunes Interoperability 
Law Goes Into Effect, ILOUNGE, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.ilounge.com/index 
.php/news/comments/french-itunes-interoperability-law-goes-into-effect/.  
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noninteroperable business strategies, as Apple did with 
iTunes,375 in order to build their own network and reap the re-
wards of network effects that need not be shared with other 
competitors (e.g., RealNetworks), seem to be able to rely on 
trade secrecy and their ability to re-engineer and re-implement 
their interfaces if a competitor successfully reverse engineers 
and implements an earlier interface. Patents may not be neces-
sary for firms to succeed with business models built on noninte-
roperable or controlled interoperability strategies.  
Lack of access to interface information is often a greater 
impediment to interoperability than patents are. Should na-
tions consider mandating disclosure interface information in 
order to foster more interoperability? The EU Software Direc-
tive did not go so far. Drafters of the Directive may have be-
lieved they did enough to induce disclosure of interface infor-
mation by authorizing reverse engineering for purposes of 
achieving interoperability.376 They may not have anticipated 
the development of very large and complex systems, such as the 
Windows OS, as to which reverse engineering has become an 
infeasible way to get access to interface information.377 The 
Software Directive provides no remedy to would-be reverse en-
gineers if interface information cannot be obtained by reverse 
engineering.378 Even when reverse engineering does enable 
second comers to obtain interface information, there may be no 
legal recourse if the developer of the interface tweaks the inter-
face and thereby thwarts unlicensed firms from attaining com-
patibility for more than a short time.379  
 
 375. See Scott M. Fulton, III, EU Consumer Protection Targets iTunes, BE-
TANEWS, Mar. 12, 2007, http://www.betanews.com/article/EU-Consumer-
Protection-Targets-iTunes/1173719408 (noting how officials in Norway chal-
lenged the legality of iTunes, in part because of its noninteroperability). 
 376. Software Directive, supra note 5, art. 6(1). 
 377. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 362 
(stating that reverse engineering was not a feasible way to get WGS-OS inter-
face information). 
 378. See Software Directive, supra note 5, art. 6 (providing protection only 
to the extent a program can be reverse engineered). 
 379. See, e.g., Bill Rosenblatt, RealNetworks and Motorola Open Apple 
iTunes/iPod Stack, DRM WATCH, July 28, 2004, http://www.drmwatch.com/ 
drmtech/article.php/3387481 (noting how RealNetworks reproduced the file 
format design of iTunes). Thereafter, Apple changed its interface and undid 
RealNetworks temporary interoperability advantage. Jon Borland, Apple 
Fights RealNetworks’ ‘Hacker Tactics’, ZDNET ASIA, Dec. 15, 2004, http://www 
.zdnetasia.com/news/security/0,39044215,39209366,00.htm. 
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Nations could, of course, require developers to be more 
forthcoming about interfaces, either as a sui generis matter or 
as a precondition of getting patent protection for interface 
techniques. Firms often prefer to maintain interface informa-
tion as a secret, but nations can mandate disclosure of informa-
tion if they deem it necessary to achieve public policy goals.380 
Nations could also regulate those who alter their interfaces for 
the purpose of making a competitor’s product noninteropera-
ble.381 
Before mandating disclosure or outlawing “predatory” 
changes to interfaces, nations should reflect on the likely effec-
tiveness of such regulation. Consider, first, the problems likely 
to attend any effort to regulate interface changes. Firms fre-
quently change the interfaces of their technologies when they 
add new features to their products.382 Consumers typically ben-
efit when new features are made available; it would be unwise 
to discourage firms from evolving their products. Regulators 
may be hard pressed to determine when firms have changed in-
terfaces to facilitate new features and when they did so to harm 
competition. Consider also that innovators may sometimes re-
gard making changes to interfaces as an appropriate self-help 
response to competitors who are trying to free-ride on their 
platform’s success, as Apple did after RealNetworks reverse-
engineered iTunes interfaces to make its media player compat-
ible with Apple’s system.383 
 
 380. See Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 351 (“The EC has required Mi-
crosoft to make disclosures sufficient to allow rivals to create server software 
functionally equivalent to Microsoft . . . .”). It is as yet unclear whether 
France’s effort to regulate disclosure of interface information for digital music 
systems will succeed in promoting greater interoperability in the digital music 
sector. 
 381. Some commentators have endorsed the use of antitrust law to patrol 
what they call “predatory innovation.” See, e.g., Montagnani, supra note 239, 
at 306–08; van Rooijen, supra note 281, at 82–83.  
 382. van Rooijen, supra note 144, at 136 (“[C]hange seems to be a danger-
ous ground for antitrust liability. Innovation necessarily involves change.”). It 
is important to understand that firms often have incentives to provide “back-
ward compatibility” so that software and documents developed for a previous 
iteration of the platform can continue to interoperate with later iterations of 
the platform. Firms are most likely to change their interfaces when they give 
up on backward compatibility by releasing a new version of the product (e.g., 
version 3.0 may have new interfaces, though versions 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 will 
have the same ones).  
 383. See Borland, supra note 379. Apple might well have considered Real-
Networks as the predator and itself as the prey in this situation. Who is the 
predator and who is the prey is, thus, not all that straightforward and may 
well be contestable. 
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Mandating disclosure of interface information may initially 
seem a simple solution, but in practice, it too may be fraught 
with difficulties. The European Commission’s effort to oversee 
Microsoft’s compliance with the order to disclose interface in-
formation is a cautionary tale.384 Microsoft produced more than 
thirty thousand pages of technical information;385 yet the 
Commission deemed the disclosures insufficient and heavily 
fined Microsoft for withholding key information.386 Determin-
ing which components of an ICT product, especially computer 
programs, are functioning as an interface or are essential to in-
teroperability may be technically very complicated and hotly 
contested.  
Achieving interoperability is, moreover, often a more com-
plex technical goal than legal commentators and policymakers 
have sometimes acknowledged. Even when one has plentiful 
access to APIs and protocols, it can still be very difficult to 
achieve interoperability.387 To make an ICT system interopera-
ble requires fine-grained agreements on syntax and seman-
tics.388 Ambiguities in interface specifications often make it dif-
ficult to implement APIs.389 Even when interface designs are 
 
 384. The U.S.-forced disclosure of interface information program ran into 
similar difficulties. See Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 337–39. 
 385. Castle, supra note 290. 
 386. Commission Decision, supra note 6, ¶¶ 728, 731, 1078. 
 387. At least four kinds of technical problems can impede interoperability: 
differences in content, differences in encoding, differences in structure, and 
differences in semantics. Consider, for example, the following impediments to 
interoperability for electronic documents representing $100. If X represents 
$100 as <A>USD 100</A> and Y presents the same concept as <A>One Hun-
dred US Dollars</A>, the discrepancy in representation of the content between 
them means that messages about $100 cannot interoperate. If X encodes $100 
as <Amount>USD 100</Amount> and Y encodes it as “USD,100”, the differ-
ences in encoding will similarly prevent interoperability. If X encodes $100 as 
<Amount>USD 100</Amount> and Y represents it as <Currency> 
USD</Currency><Amount>100</Amount>, structural differences will thwart 
interoperability. Finally if X represents $100 as <Amount>USD 
100</Amount> and Y represents this as <Price>USD 100</Price>, semantic 
differences will thwart interoperability. GLUSHKO & MCGRATH, supra note 8, 
§ 6.0.  
 388. Id. § 6.0. If, for example, an interface calls for location information, 
interoperability may not occur if the platform is expecting GPS coordinates 
and the application has encoded location information in postal codes. Similar-
ly, an API for requesting weather information may be difficult to implement if 
the entity from which it is seeking weather data has separate categories for 
temperature, humidity, windspeed, and the like. With interfaces, details like 
this matter a great deal. 
 389. Open interfaces are generally more programmer-friendly than pro-
prietary ones because programmers who implement open interfaces are more 
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well-documented and standardized, firms may still need to de-
velop guidelines, obtain expert advice about how to comply with 
them, and even to obtain access to test suites and other tools to 
get the details right.390  
It may thus be unwise to mandate full disclosure of inter-
face information across the board for at least three reasons. 
First, many technical difficulties attend attaining interopera-
bility in the real world, even when one has considerable 
amounts of interoperability information. Second, there is consi-
derable imprecision about exactly what information would have 
to be disclosed to achieve interoperability. Third, there is a risk 
that requiring full disclosure of all minute details necessary to 
achieve interoperability will undermine incentives to invest in 
innovative ICT products.  
Nations could, however, facilitate greater access to inter-
face information through some more modest measures. They 
might, for example, emulate the EU Software Directive by 
treating license terms that forbid reverse engineering as a legal 
nullity, at least insofar as the reverse engineering is underta-
ken for purposes of discerning information essential to intero-
perability.391 Nations might also recognize or create a privilege 
in patent law, akin to that already recognized in copyright, an-
ticircumvention, and trade secrecy laws, to permit reverse en-
gineering for purposes of getting access to interface informa-
tion.392 
There is finally the question about whether refusals to dis-
close or license interface information or interface patents 
should be treated differently depending on whether the would-
be interoperator plans to develop a complementary or a func-
tionally equivalent product or service.  
The principal argument for allowing unlicensed second-
comers to use interface information to develop complementary 
products, but not functional equivalents (or in the Commis-
sion’s terms, one-way, but not two-way interoperability) is that 
 
likely to refine the specification to provide more precise substitutes for opaque 
or confusing terms. Erik Wilde, What Are You Talking About?, in 2007 IEEE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SERVICES COMPUTING 256, 258 (2007). 
 390. See, e.g., Page & Childers, supra note 302, at 130 (explaining that Mi-
crosoft was required to undertake the development of test suites). 
 391. Software Directive, supra note 5, art. 9.1. 
 392. See supra Part II.B. For a discussion of the interoperability exception 
to the anticircumvention rules, see Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anti-
Circumvention’s Interoperability Policy, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009). 
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there is a risk that the developer of the interface will not be 
able to recoup its R&D expenses because functional equivalents 
will undercut sales of that developers’ principal products (e.g., 
the platform), whereas complements are likely to build demand 
for the platform.393 Establishing a reasonable royalty for licens-
ing interface information as to developers of complementary 
products will generally be easier than establishing a reasonable 
royalty for licensing as to developers of functionally equivalent 
products, as the platform’s provider probably has a licensing 
program for development of complementary products, but prob-
ably not for functional equivalents.  
However, there are some reasons why IP law should treat 
interfaces the same, regardless of whether they are intended 
for use in building complements or equivalents. For one thing, 
in today’s complex networked world, it is no longer as easy as it 
once was to distinguish between complements and substitutes. 
Interfaces now enable more complex exchanges than before; a 
network-based program may, for example, be acting as a com-
plement one moment, but as a functional equivalent the 
next.394 Any effort to make a sharp legal distinction between in-
terface information for complements and functional equivalents 
is thus likely to break down.395 Second, much of the information 
necessary to make a complementary product is also necessary 
to know to make a functional equivalent, and vice versa. This 
too makes a sharp legal distinction between them problematic. 
Third, it is rare in IP law to treat information as protectable for 
one purpose, but not for another.396 Neither copyright nor trade 
 
 393. See Weiser, supra note 30, at 560–61 (arguing that IP law should al-
low unlicensed parties to develop complements, but not substitutes, at least 
not until and unless the incumbent becomes a monopolist). The ability to re-
coup investments was the main concern Microsoft raised to the Commission 
about being forced to supply highly detailed interface information to Sun. 
Commission Decision, supra note 6, ¶ 274.  
 394. See, e.g., Lévêque, supra note 247, at 112–13 (describing how servers 
and PC OS are partial complements and partial substitutes).  
 395. Consider this variant on Altai. Suppose Altai had reverse engineered 
the compatibility component of CA-Scheduler to get access to interface infor-
mation. It would have done so in order to make a program that was a func-
tional equivalent to CA-Scheduler, but it needed the interface information 
primarily in order to interoperate with the IBM OS programs with which both 
Altai’s and CA’s programs were designed to run (that is, to develop a comple-
ment to the IBM platform). 
 396. International News Service v. Associated Press is a rare example in 
which certain information (news) was treated as private property as between 
INS and AP, although it was common property as to the general public. 248 
U.S. 215, 235 (1918). The INS concept of “quasi-property” has been discredited 
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secrecy law, for example, has distinguished between reverse 
engineering undertaken to make complements or substitutes 
when analyzing the lawfulness of reverse engineering and 
reuse of information discerned from reverse engineering.397 Re-
verse-engineers frequently aim to make competing products.398 
Creating a new legal distinction to allow reuse of interface in-
formation to make complements, but not substitutes, would be 
a novel move for IP law. Fourth, firms sometimes adopt busi-
ness strategies that do not conform to the usual plat-
form/complement story. Nintendo, for example, lost money 
every time it sold an NES console.399 Its strategy for achieving 
financial success depended upon controlling the market for 
complementary products (i.e., games) for this platform.400 By 
selling unlicensed complements for Nintendo’s console, Atari 
Games was arguably thwarting Nintendo’s recoupment strate-
gy. Finally, there is some evidence that firms can recoup R&D 
investments even when they facilitate access to interface in-
formation for developers of functionally equivalent products.401 
IBM and Fujitsu, for instance, were able to coexist in supplying 
functionally equivalent software for mainframe computers. 
Some competition among different implementations of a plat-
form may be beneficial to consumers who at the same time also 
benefit from the platform’s stability as a de facto standard.  
 
over time. Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and 
Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 
CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 388–95 (1989). 
 397. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 
1992) (agreeing with Accolade that it is fair use to reverse engineer to get in-
formation necessary to make complementary products); Sony Computer 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
it is fair use to reverse engineer to get access to information to make function-
al equivalent).   
 398. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1577 (identifying the 
intention of reverse engineering to “draw customers away from the maker of 
the reverse-engineered product”). 
 399. See id. at 1618–19 (“In the game system market, platform developers 
typically lose money on sales of consoles, making up losses on sales of games 
and peripherals.”). 
 400. Id. 
 401. The CFI Decision relied in part on this reasoning in responding to Mi-
crosoft’s concerns about its ability to recoup R&D expenses if forced to disclose 
interface information to Sun and others. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. 
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 710. It also relied on Microsoft’s disclosure of 
interface information under the U.S. consent decree and the settlement with 
Sun. Id. ¶¶ 693, 703. But see Weiser, supra note 30, at 560–68 (expressing 
concerns about the ability of platform providers to recoup R&D expenses if 
competitors can freely use interfaces to develop directly competing platforms). 
 2018 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1943 
 
It is, however, noteworthy that the three most contentious 
disputes over program interfaces—the European Commission’s 
case against IBM in the 1980s, the IBM-Fujitsu litiga-
tion/arbitration, and the Commission’s recent case against Mi-
crosoft—all involved efforts by dominant firms to thwart com-
petitors from making functional equivalent products, not 
complements. 
What we can say with some confidence is that interface pa-
tents pose the gravest risks for competition and follow-on inno-
vation when the patents cover techniques that are essential to 
interoperability, when those patents are held by firms with 
market power, and when there are incentives for firms in do-
minant positions to exercise interface patents to exclude com-
petitors from the market or to leverage the firm’s power in one 
market to gain power in an adjacent market, especially disrup-
tive new entrants with an entrepreneurial bent.402 Any regula-
tory intervention as to interface patents should only be under-
taken in a targeted manner to address specific abuses, at least 
until there is systematic empirical evidence that patents are, in 
fact, more serious impediments to interoperability than they 
seem to be today. 
  CONCLUSION   
Interoperability among ICT components and systems is 
widely viewed as socially desirable insofar as it promotes com-
petition, innovation, and consumer choice. Because firms often 
have incentives to reveal information necessary to enable oth-
ers to build compatible technologies so that their platforms are 
more attractive to consumers, many either do not assert IP 
rights in their interfaces or license such rights on open terms. 
Some firms, however, prefer to maintain interfaces as trade se-
crets or to seek patents for them as part of a business strategy 
that is aimed at controlling which firms are able to interoperate 
with their technologies. The principal advantage of patents 
over trade secrecy in the protection of interfaces is that patents 
confer a strong legal right to exclude others from building tech-
nologies that incorporate the patented technique. If the tech-
nique is essential to achieving interoperability, the exclusio-
nary potency of an interface patent is considerable. 
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Many commentators and policymakers have recognized 
that patents on interfaces can be and sometimes have been ex-
ercised to block the development of interoperable technologies. 
Out of concern about the exclusionary power of such patents, 
they have proposed a wide array of legal and policy measures to 
ensure that interoperability can occur. This Article is the first 
comprehensive analysis of the twenty-some policy responses 
that have thus far been proposed or implemented to blunt the 
power of interface patents.  
This Article makes four main points. First, there is less 
need for strong measures, such as barring patents on interface 
innovations or treating the exercise of interface patents to block 
interoperability as misuse of the patents, than some commenta-
tors seem to believe. Second, insofar as interface patents do 
emerge as more serious impediments to interoperability than 
they have been to date, there are adequate policy responses in 
place in various countries that can be used to address them. 
Third, some tailoring of patent rules and patent reforms may 
be advisable in order to promote greater interoperability among 
ICT systems. Fourth, patents are often less of an impediment 
to interoperability than the secrecy of interface information, 
which may be difficult or impossible to reverse engineer, ambi-
guities in interface specifications, and changes in interfaces 
that may be made in new versions or features of an ICT sys-
tem. This Article explains why it may be difficult to bring about 
more interoperability by mandating greater disclosure of inter-
face information or regulating what kinds of changes firms can 
make to their interfaces.  
 
 
